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INTRODUCTION
The case law regarding the division of powers encompassed by
our "structural Constitution" can make an area as imprecise as free-
dom of speech seem a paragon of clarity.' In hard cases, deciphering
the line between the power of the federal courts and the federal legis-
lature rarely involves actions that are dearly labeled "adjudication"
and "legislation," for only conflicts in which these categories blur are
likely to be brought to court. This Note addresses one type of prob-
lem that occasionally arises concerning the separation of powers be-
tween the courts and Congress: Congress' power to enact legislation
that affects the outcome of cases pending in federal courts.2
When addressing this question, the strategy of modem courts has
been to draw a definitional line between legislative and judicial acts.
The principal precedent upon which modem decisions rely is the
post-Civil War case of United States v. Klein.3 As the substance of legis-
lation begins to replace the function of the judiciary, or seems to
strain our traditional conception of what legislation ought to accom-
plish, the courts have attempted to articulate rules that will pigeon-
hole the legislation into one of two categories: a valid "legislative" act
or an invalid 'judicial" act. Modem courts have derived two rules
from Klein that, they argue, establish this distinction: (1) legislation is
invalid if it prescribes a rule of decision in a pending case without
changing the underlying law; (2) legislation is invalid if it mandates
Modem commentators have described the Supreme Court's separation of powers
jurisprudence as a muddle. See Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139
U. PA. L. REv. 1513, 1517 (1991) ("Unanimity among constitutional scholars is all but un-
heard of. Perhaps when achieved it should be celebrated. But one point on which the
literature has spoken virtually in unison is no cause for celebration: the Supreme Court's
treatment of the constitutional separation of powers is an incoherent muddle."). Brown
cites a long list of scholars in support of this claim. See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, From Sick
Chicken to Synar: The Evolution and Subsequent De-Evolution of the Separation of Powers, 1987
B.Y.U. L. REV. 719, 721 (1987); Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separa-
tion-of-Powers Questions-A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 Coum. L. REv. 488, 489-96 (1987);
Paul R. Verkuil, Separation of Powers, the Rule of Law, and the Idea of Independence, 30 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 301, 312 (1989).
2 This is a problem that is likely to arise more frequently given the Court's recent
decision in James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 111 S. Ct. 2439 (1991). As discussed
infra notes 12 to 17 and accompanying text, Beam appears to portend retroactive applica-
tion of new judicial law in all civil litigation. As such, unpopular judicial opinions may
frequently fuel Congressional attempts to change the consequences of their retroactive
application. But see Anthony M. Sabino, A Statutory Beacon or a Relighted Lampf? The Consti-
tutional Crisis of the New Limitary Period for Federal Securities Actions, 28 TULSA LJ. 23, 61-64
(1992).
3 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872).
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findings of fact or conclusions of law.4 Each of these rules is intended
to identify a characteristic of the legislation that takes it beyond a leg-
islative act to the performance of a typically judicial task.
The purpose of this Note is twofold. First, it challenges the ade-
quacy of this categorical approach, arguing that this approach does
not follow from a careful reading of Klein and that it fails to provide
principled guidance for the lower courts. Rules involving terms such
as "underlying law" and "fact finding" are hopelessly opaque.5 Sec-
ond, this Note offers an alternative frame of reference for approach-
ing this separation of powers problem by focusing on the retroactive
aspect of such legislation. The Note contends that a separation of
powers analysis in this area should assess the purposes and conse-
quences of the retroactive legislation, rather than attempt to wedge
the legislation into some murky category.
The occasion for addressing this issue is presented by the recent
spate of lower federal court decisions regarding the constitutionality
of section 27A of the Securities Exchange Act, enacted as section 476
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act
(FDICIA).6 Section 27A provides a new limitations period for all sec-
tion 10(b) securities actions commenced prior to June 20, 1991. The
legislation is retroactive in scope insofar as it relates only to events
prior to enactment and, more narrowly, as it relates only to legal ac-
tions commenced prior to enactment. To understand the underlying
4 Some commentators include a third alternative: legislation is invalid if it mandates
a particular decision on the merits or forecloses a decision on the merits. This formula-
tion, however, does not appear in the principal decisions of the circuit courts and, if taken
literally, would apply to any application of new law in a pending litigation. Thus, while this
formulation suggests the evil underlying the legislation at issue in Klein, it does not provide
any guidance for deciding specific cases. For an explanation of the three interpretations of
Klein offered by district courts addressing the constitutionality of § 27A, see Craig W. Palm,
The Constitutionality of Section 27A of the Securities Exchange Act: Is Congress Rubbing Lampf the
Wrong Way?, 37 ViLt. L. REv. 1213 (1992). Palm examines § 27A in light of each of these
rules and concludes that is it constitutional. Compare Jill E. Fisch, As Time Goes By: New
Questions About The Statute of Limitations For Rule lOb-5, 61 Foannm L. REv. S1O, S119-S120
(1993) (conflating the three criteria and concluding that § 27A is unconstitutional); Heidi
J. Goldstein, Note, When the Supreme Court Shuts Its Doors, May Congress Re-Open Them?: Sepa-
ration of Powers Challenges to § 27A of the Securities Exchange Act, 34 B.C. L. REv. 853, 874-75
(1993) (concluding that the operative rule is whether the legislation changes the law);
Patrick T. Murphy, Note, Section 27A of the SEA: An Unplugged Lampf Sheds No Constitutional
Light 78 MnN. L. REv. 197, 211-12 (1993) (emphasizing the "rule of decision" rationale
and concluding that § 27A(a) usurped the judicial function but nonetheless is constitu-
tional); Ronner, infra note 266, at 1067-72 (proposing a new test for Klein situations and
concluding that § 27A is unconstitutional). Although agreeing with Palm's ultimate con-
clusion, the purpose of this Note is to provoke a reconsideration of the way in which we
analyze this issue.
5 See AxelJohnson Inc. v. Arthur Andersen, 6 F.3d 78, 81 (2d Cir. 1993) ("The con-
ceptual line between a valid legislative change in law and an invalid legislative act of adjudi-
cation is often difficult to draw.").
6 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-1 (1992).
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purpose of section 27A and the mechanism that Congress adopted to
achieve this purpose, it is necessary to recount briefly the events lead-
ing to its enactment.7
On June 19, 1991, in Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v.
Gilbertson,8 the Supreme Court announced a "new rule" for determin-
ing the appropriate statute of limitations period for section 10(b) se-
curities actions. The Court rejected the traditional approach in
Section 10(b) actions of applying the most analogous state statute of
limitations. Under the new rule, the appropriate limitation period is
the most analogous federal period, as prescribed by sections nine and
fifteen of the Securities Exchange Act.9 These sections provide that
actions must be filed within one year of the discovery of the fraud but
not, in any case, more than three years after the fraud occurred.10 In
those jurisdictions that had not previously adopted the one/three pe-
riod, the Lampf rule reduced the period of time allowed for filing and
eliminated the liberal tolling doctrines provided by state fraud limita-
tion periods."
On the same day as Lampf, the Court decided James B. Beam Distil-
ling Co. v. Georgia.12 The issue raised in Beam was the propriety of
"selective prospectivity." By this phrase, the Court referred to the judi-
cial practice of deciding a case by introducing a "new" rule of law that
upsets prior precedent,13 and applying that new rule to the parties
before the court, but not to other pending litigation or, more broadly,
to causes of action arising prior to the decision of the case. 14 The
Court held in Beam that judicial use of selective prospectivity was im-
proper.' 5 Beam's holding implied, of course, that Lampf s limitations
7 See Sabino, supra note 2, at 27-30; Fisch, supra note 4, at S109, S115; Palm, supra
note 4, at 1260-64.
8 111 S. Ct. 2773 (1991).
9 For a discussion of the adoption of the new limitation period by Lampf, see Thomas
H. Stewart, Note, One Statute, One Statute of Limitations; At Last Uniformity For Section 10(b)
Claims: Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 60 U. Cn. L. REv. 533
(1991).
10 Lampf 111 S. Ct. at 2780-81.
11 See Lyman Johnson, Securities Fraud and the Mirage of Repose, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 607
(1992) (arguing that the better reading of Lampf is that equitable tolling doctrines
survive).
12 111 S. Ct. 2439 (1991).
13 We should set aside the question of whether one deems the novelty as making new
law or as finding the law to be other than it had heretofore been understood.
14 The Court contrasted "selective prospectivity" with "pure retrospectivity" and "pure
prospectivity." A court applying the principle of pure retrospectivity would apply the new
rule to all pending and future cases. A court applying the principle of pure prospectivity
would treat the new rule as a law to be applied in future cases, but refuse to apply it to the
parties presently before the court or to pending litigants. Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2443-44.
15 The ground for the holding is the subject of lively debate. The opinion ofJustice
Souter, announcing the judgment of the Court was joined only by Justice Stevens. Justice
Souter appears to rest the holding on the application of conflict of laws principles. Justice
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period applied to pending as well as future section 10(b) litigation.' 6
As many plaintiffs, relying on the more liberal state limitations periods
applicable prior to Lampf, had brought section 10(b) actions more
than three years after the alleged fraud, defendants quickly moved to
dismiss their claims.' 7
Scalia's concurrence,joined byJustices Marshall and Blackmun, based his decision on con-
stitutional grounds. He found the use of selective prospectivity to be beyond the judicial
power of Article III courts. Justice White concurred on stare decisis grounds because he felt
that Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987) governed, despite the fact that he dissented in
Griffith. Justice O'Connor, joined by Rehnquist and Kennedy, dissented. See The Supreme
Court, 1991 Term-Leading Cases, 105 HARv. L. REv. 177, 339-49 (1992).
16 One commentator has suggested that it is uncertain whether the Lampfrule would
be applied retroactively to other pending cases. The argument is that Chevron v. Huson,
404 U.S. 97 (1971), creates a special exception to the Beam rule, which prohibits selective
prospectivity, for changes in limitation periods. See Sabino, supra note 2, at 61-65. The
claim amounts to little more than wishful thinking, as Justice O'Connor's despairing dis-
sent in Lampfindicates. Justice Souter's approach in Beam rests on the notion that treating
the parties before the court and the parties in pending cases differently, a practice implicit
in selective prospectivity, is inequitable. That policy concern is unaffected by differences in
the type of rule changed. While the distinction between limitation rules and substantive
rules may be relevant to a determination of whether or not to apply pure prospectivity, the
Court's decision to apply the new rule to the Lampfparties foreclosed consideration of the
new rule's applicability to other pending parties. See infra note 21, citing cases applying
Lampf retroactively.
Lyman Johnson offers a better argument regarding the limited effect of Lampf on
pending plaintiffi' actions. He argues that the Lampf rule does not spell the demise of
equitable tolling nor the triumph of repose. This is because the one year/three year pe-
riod should prompt courts to recognize that a good doctrine of repose distinguishes be-
tween applications in the context of fraudulent concealment and applications in simple fraud.
According to Johnson, in cases where the defendant conceals the fraud, the legal clock
does not begin to run because the wrong has not ceased. SeeJohnson, supra note 11, at
614-17. For a case misapplying the tolling doctrine as advocated byJohnson, see McCool v.
Strata Oil, 972 F.2d 1452 (7th Cir. 1992).
17 For example, suppose that Smith is a client of brokerJones in Denver. Colorado
has a three year statute of limitations for fraud and a rule for equitable tolling of the
period that runs from the date of the discovery of the fraud. Jones defrauds Smith in
violation of § 10(b). Consider the following two scenarios. First, Smith discovers Jones'
fraud one year after the occurrence of such fraud. One and a half years later, Smith files a
§ 10(b) action againstJones. Under Colorado law, Smith is within the three year period
with or without equitable tolling. However, under the Lampfrule, Smith failed to bring the
action within one year of discovery and so the action is time barred. Second, Smith discov-
ers the action two and a half years after the fraud and then files a § 10(b) action one year
later. Under Colorado law, Smith's filing is timely under the equitable tolling doctrine.
Under the Lampfrule, Smith is time barred because the three year period serves as a stat-
ute of repose. Motions for dismissal based on these grounds were affirmed by several cir-
cuit courts. Pommer v. Medtest Corp., 961 F.2d 620 (7th Cir. 1992); Anixter v. Home-
Stake Prod. Co., 947 F.2d 897 (10th Cir. 1991) vacated, 112 S. Ct. 1757 (1992) (remanded
for reconsideration in light of§ 27A); Welch v. Cadre Capital, 946 F.2d 185 (2d. Cir. 1991);
Boudreau v. Deloitte, Haskins & Sells, 942 F.2d 497 (8th Cir. 1991). District courts fol-
lowed suit. Cohen v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 777 F. Supp. 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Conti-
nental Bank, Nat. Ass'n v. Village of Ludlow, 777 F. Supp. 92 (D. Mass. 1991); Lewis v.
Hermann, 775 F. Supp. 1137 (N.D. Ill. 1991); Randolph County Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
Sutliffe, 775 F. Supp. 1113 (S.D. Ohio 1991); Hastie v. American Agri-Corp., 774 F. Supp.
1251 (C.D. Cal. 1991); Bank of Denver v. Southwestern Capital Group, Inc., 770 F. Supp.
914 [Vol. 79:910
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Outraged at the destruction of meritorious claims on technical
grounds against such securities villains as Charles Keating and
Michael Milken, Congress sought to remedy the Lampf decision.' 8
Failing to reach a consensus on a new limitations period, Congress
instead enacted section 27A of the Exchange Act.' 9 Section 27A pro-
vides (a) that in cases filed prior to Lampf the appropriate limitations
period is dictated by the statute of limitations existing in that jurisdic-
tion prior to Lampf and (b) that any cases pending prior to Lampf
which had subsequently been dismissed on Lampf grounds be
reinstated.20
595 (D. Colo. 1991); Brumbaugh v. Princeton Partners, 766 F. Supp. 497 (S.D. W. Va.
1991).
18 Two House Committees, the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs
(CBFUA) and the Committee on Energy and Commerce (CEC), considered responses to
the Lampf decision. The records of both committees make it clear that the primary con-
cem of the Committees was to reverse the dismissal of claims arising from the wake of the
financial scandals of the late 1980s, the Savings & Loan scandals and the insider-trading
scandals. Representative Markey stated that, unless § 27A [the act ultimately adopted] was
enacted, "over $4 billion of fraud claims, including those against Milken, Keating and Fred
Carr, are threatened with pending dismissal motions solely as a result of Lampf." In re
Brichard Sec. Litig., 788 F. Supp. 1098, 1105 (N.D. Cal 1992) (quoting from 137 Cong.
Rec. H11,812 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991)). Similarly, Representative Dingell, the Chairman
of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, explained:
This provision is critically important because Lampf has resulted in the dis-
missal of many private rule 10(b)-5 actions against figures in major financial
scandals including Charles Keating, Michael Milken, and others. Those
cases can now be reinstated on motion.
Id. at 1105 (quoting from 137 Cong. Rec. H11,811 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991)).
A concern for fairness to plaintiffs might not have been the only motivation for the
elected representatives to enact § 27A. At the time, Congress was within one-year of the
election cycle, and the failure of the government to properly regulate the securities and
banking industries was often cited as the cause of the crisis. Some of this criticism was
muted by pointing the finger to private individuals who were most abusive of the long leash
provided by the government. Such a windfall to those individuals deflecting attention
from the governmental failure would not have been lost on the public.
For a different interpretation of the congressional motive, see Sabino, supra note 2, at
26-30.
19 President Bush signed the Act on December 19, 1991. See section 476 of the Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, 105 Stat. 2236, Pub. L. No.
102-242; 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (Supp. 1992).
20 The text of the Act is as follows:
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is amended by inserting after sec-
tion 27 (15 U.S.C. 78aa) the following new section:
"SPECIAL PROVISION RELATING TO STATUTE OF LIMI-
TATIONS ON PRIVATE CAUSES OF ACTION
"Sec. 27A.(a) Effect on Pending Causes of Action.-The limitation
period for any private civil action implied under section 10(b) of
this Act that was commenced on or before June 19, 1991, shall be
the limitation period provided by the laws applicable in thejurisdic-
tion, including principles of retroactivity, such as laws existed on
June 19, 1991.
(b) Effect on Dismissed Causes of Action.-Any private civil action
implied under section 10(b) of this Act that was commenced on or
before June 19, 1991-
1994] 915
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
Defendants seeking the shelter of Lampfhave attacked the consti-
tutionality of section 27A on several grounds.21 These arguments fall
into three broad classifications. First, defendants argue that section
27A violates separation of powers principles because: (a) Congress
may not require the Court to conduct itself in a manner contrary to
the Constitution;22 (b) Congress may not disturb final judgments of
(1) which was dismissed as time barred subsequent to June
19, 1991, and
(2) which would have been timely filed under the limitation
period provided by the laws applicable in the jurisdiction,
including principles of retroactivity, as such laws existed on
June 19, 1991
shall be reinstated on motion by the plaintiff not later than 60 days
after the date of enactment of this section.
Id.
21 It is ironic that the result of Lampfhas been to fuel an enormous body of litigation,
since one of the purposes underlying the Court's adoption of a uniform statute of limita-
tions was to reduce the amount of litigation being consumed by the question.
Ingenious or ingenuous defendants, depending on one's perspective, have also con-
tended that pre-Lampf actions remain time-barred under § 27A. The argument runs: (i)
the limitation period announced in § 27A is the period "provided by the laws applicable in
the jurisdiction" prior to Lampf, (ii) the Supreme Court does not "make" law, it "finds" law,
and thus in deciding Lampf the Court determined what the law of limitations was;, there-
fore, (iii) the law "applicable in the jurisdiction" prior to Lampf is Lampf The argument
requires reading the language of § 27A in a vacuum. If Congress intended anything, it
intended that Lampfnot govern decisionmaking in these cases. No court has accepted the
contention. See, e.g., In re Taxable Municipal Bond Sec. Litig., 796 F. Supp. 954 (E.D. La.
1992); Wegbreit v. Marley Orchards Corp., 793 F. Supp. 965 (E.D. Wash. 1992); Brown v.
The Hutton Group, 795 F. Supp. 1307 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); In re Brichard Sec. Litig., 788 F.
Supp. 1098, 1107-08 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
The application of § 27A does raise some interesting problems for those circuits that
adopted the one/three limitation period prior to Lampf but then decided not to apply
that period retroactively. The decision in Beam mandated that the period be treated retro-
actively. The question then becomes whether, in such a jurisdiction, § 27A requires the
application of pre-Beam principles of retroactivity. See, e.g., Walsche v. First Investor's
Corp., 981 F.2d 649 (2d. Cir. 1992) (applying the pre-Beam rule of retroactivity); McCool v.
Strata Oil, 972 F.2d 1452 (7th Cir. 1992); Fry v. UAL Corporation, 1992 WL 177086 (N.D.
Ill. July 23, 1992) (holding that the Seventh Circuit's one year/three year rule, as adopted
in Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385 (7th Cir. 1990), should not have retroac-
tive effect); Brown v. The Hutton Group, 795 F. Supp. 1307 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (applying the
Second Circuit's pre-Beam rule of retroactivity); Ades v. Deloitte & Touche, 1992 WL 6142
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (same).
22 The argument is that § 27A requires the court to treat the Lampflimitation period
in a selectively prospective manner and so directs courts to act beyond their Article III
powers as purportedly announced in Beam. The success of this argument rests on one's
reading of Beam. To date, all circuit courts that have addressed the question have found
that § 27A is constitutional on either of two grounds: (1) because Beam is only a restraint
on the judicial enunciation of selective prospectivity, not on the legislature; and/or (2)
because Beam is not constitutionally grounded. Axel Johnson Inc. v. Arthur Andersen, 6
F.3d 78 (2nd Cir. 1993); Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. First Republicbank Corp., 997 F.2d
39 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 680 (1994); Cooke v. Manufactured Homes, Inc.,
998 F.2d 1256 (4th Cir. 1993); Cooperativa De Ahorro Y Credito Aguado v. Kidder,
Peabody & Co., 993 F.2d 269 (1st Cir. 1993); Gray v. First Winthrop Corp., 998 F.2d 1564
(9th Cir. 1993); Berning v. AG. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 990 F.2d 272 (7th Cir. 1993);
Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 977 F.2d 1533 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
[Vol. 79:910
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federal courts;23 and (c), under the principles of United States v.
Klein,24 Congress may not legislate with the sole purpose and effect of
altering outcomes in pending litigation.25 Second, they assert that
section 27A violates the Due Process Clause.26 Lastly, they claim that
section 27A violates the Equal Protection Clause.27
1841 (1993). But see Ronner, infra note 266, at 1071-72 (arguing that § 27A is unconstitu-
tional because it invades the judicial province marked out by Beam).
23 The attack focuses on the provision in § 27A(b) that requires reinstatement of
cases dismissed on the basis of Lampf The circuit courts are split on the issue of whether a
final judgment resting on a technical ground is due less weight than a final judgment on
the merits. Compare Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 1 F.3d 1487 (6th Cir. 1993) (§ 27A(b)
is unconstitutional), petition for cert. filed, 62 U.S.L.W. 3503 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1994) (No. 93-
1121) andJohnston v. Cigna Corp., 14 F.3d 486 (10th Cir. 1993) (same), petition for cert.
filed, 62 U.S.L.W. 3757 (U.S. May 2, 1994) (No. 93-1723); with Pacific Mutual Life Ins. v.
First Republicbank Corp., 997 F.2d 39 (5th Cir. 1993) (§ 27A(b) is constitutional) (U.S.
Jan. 11, 1994), cert. granted, 114S. Ct. 680 (1994). See also Goldstein supra note 4, at 895-98;
Palm supra note 4, at 1284-90 (same); Murphy, supra note 4, at 223-28 (same). Although
this Note does not specifically address the issue, its reasoning is consistent with the view
that § 27A(b) is unconstitutional. Those courts finding § 27A constitutional on this
ground treat the issue essentially the same as they treat due process objections to the stat-
ute. Since rights do not vest with the passage of a limitations period, these courts reason,
Congress does not divest a property interest by reinstating actions accorded final judgment
by virtue of dismissal for time barred. This conflation of the due process and separation of
powers grounds for constitutionality restricts the scope of protection of individual liberty
interests that separation of powers serves. The holding in Wheeling Bridge is contrary to this
anemic view of the finality ofjudgments. See infra notes 211-23 and accompanying text.
24 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872).
25 To date, all circuit courts addressing the question have found § 27A constitutional
with regard to this issue. See Axel Johnson Inc. v. Arthur Andersen, 6 F.3d 78 (2nd Cir.
1993); Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. First Republicbank Corp., 997 F.2d 39 (5th Cir. 1993),
cert. granted on other grounds, 114 S. Ct. 680 (1994); Cooke v. Manufactured Homes, Inc., 998
F.2d 1256 (4th Cir. 1993); Cooperativa De Ahorro Y Credito Aguado v. Kidder, Peabody &
Co., 993 F.2d 269 (1st Cir. 1993); Gray v. First Winthrop Corp., 989 F.2d 1564 (9th Cir.
1993); Berning v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 990 F.2d 272 (7th Cir. 1993); Henderson v.
Scientific-Atlanta Inc., 971 F.2d 1567 (l1th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 95 (1993);
Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 977 F.2d 1533 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
1841 (1993).
26 The due process argument relies on the claim that the defendant's rights vested
when the Lampf limitation period passed. No court has accepted this argument. See, e.g.,
Gray v. First Winthrop Corp., 989 F.2d 1564 (9th Cir. 1993); Henderson v. Scientific-At-
lanta, Inc., 971 F.2d 1567 (lth Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 95 (1993); Anixter v.
Home-Stake Prod. Co., 977 F.2d 1533 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1841 (1993).
These courts have relied on International Union of Elec., Radio and Mach. Workers v.
Robbins & Myers, 429 U.S. 229 (1976), for the proposition that rights do not vest with the
passage of a limitations period. See also Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620 (1885) (distinguish-
ing the effect of changing time bar concerning real property and assumpsit).
27 The equal protection challenges rest on either or both of two class claims: (i)
§ 27A treats residents of states differently on the basis of residence and (ii) § 27A treats
parties in cases filed prior to Lampf differently than parties filing after Lampfwas decided.
No court has accepted these arguments. See, e.g., Gray v. First Winthrop Corp., 989 F.2d
1564 (9th Cir. 1993); Henderson v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 971 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1992);
Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 977 F.2d 1533 (10th Cir. 1992).
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This Note will examine only the Klein prong of the separation of
powers attack.28 Analysis of this area rests on two related doctrines.
The first, stemming from United States v. Schooner Peggy, states that
courts, whether trial or appellate, must apply the law as it exists at the
time of decision regardless of whether that law differs from the law
existing at the time the action was filed. 29 This is often referred to as
the "Changed Law Rule."30 The second, derived from Klein, creates
an exception to the Changed Law Rule for legislation that violates the
separation of powers by improperly intruding on judicial prerogatives.
The precise nature of this exception is disputed. As noted above,
modem courts have traditionally interpreted Klein as standing for
either or both of two rules: (1) that Congress may not prescribe a rule
of decision for pending cases without changing underlying law (the
"underlying law exception"); and (2) that Congress may not mandate
findings of fact or conclusions of law for pending cases (the "dictation
of fact exception").31 Each of these interpretations of Klein's holding
is derived from ambiguous language of Klein to the effect that Con-
gress violates the separation of powers when it "prescribe[s] rules of
decision to the Judicial Department of the government in cases pend-
ing before it."3 2 Federal district court opinions concerning section
27A clearly show that, regardless of the rule relied upon, neither of
the two rule-based approaches provides a clear basis for decision-mak-
ing.33 The purpose of this Note is to demonstrate that section 27A
28 For an excellent discussion of all of the arguments raised against § 27A, see Palm,
supra note 4. See also Sabino, supra note 2; Fisch, supra note 4; Goldstein, supra note 4;
Murphy, supra note 4.
29 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801).
30 This Note borrows this phrase from Gordon G. Young, Congressional Regulation of
Federal Courts'Jurisdiction and Processes: United States v. Klein Revisited, 1981 Wisc. L. Rev.
1189, 1240 (1981).
31 See Palm, supra note 4, at 1302-1316.
32 Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 146.
33 Despite the current unanimity of the circuits, there was significant disagreement
among the district courts concerning the constitutionality of § 27A under the Klein doc-
trine. A majority of district courts found that § 27A was a constitutional change in law. See,
e.g., Arioli v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 800 F. Supp. 1478 (E.D. Mich. 1992); Cannistraci
v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 796 F. Supp. 619 (D. Mass. 1992); Duke v. Touche Ross, No.
90 CIV. 5610 (JFK), 1992 WL 197412 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 1992); Kalmanson v. McLaughlin,
No. 86 CIV. 9366 (JFK), 1992 WL 190139 (S.D.N.Y.July 29, 1992); Fry v. UAL Corp., No. 90
C 0999, 1992 WL 177086 (N.D. Ill.July 23, 1992); Rabin v. Fivzar Assoc., 801 F. Supp. 1045
(S.D.N.Y. 1992); Lundy v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 794 F. Supp. 346 (N.D. Cal. 1992); Malo
v. Advanced Filtration Systems, Ltd., 795 F. Supp. 1364 (E.D. Penn. 1992); In reAmerican
Continental Corp./Lincoln Say. and Loan Sec. Litig., 794 F. Supp. 1424 (D. Ariz. 1992);
Threiber v. Katz, 796 F. Supp. 1054 (E.D. Mich. 1992); Gray v. First Winthrop Corp., 776
F.Supp 504 (N.D. Cal. 1991), rev'd, 989 F.2d 1564 (9th Cir. 1993); In reTaxable Mun. Bond
Sec. Litig., 796 F. Supp. 954 (E.D. La. 1992); Wegbreit v. Marley Orchards Corp., 793 F.
Supp. 965 (E.D. Wash. 1992); Brown v. Hutton Group, 795 F. Supp. 1307 (S.D.N.Y. 1992);
Adler v. Berg Harmon Assocs., 790 F. Supp. 1235 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Axel Johnson, Inc. v.
Arthur Andersen e Co., 790 F. Supp. 476 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), afftd, 6 F.3d 78 78 (2d Cir.
1993); Hastie v. American Agri-Corp., No. CV92-2392, SACV 90-164-GLT, SACV 90-243-
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offers the Supreme Court an opportunity to redefine this area of sepa-
ration of powers jurisprudence by rejecting rule-based approaches
and adopting a functionalist test for determining whether Congress
has exceeded its power by enacting a retroactive law that affects pend-
ing litigation.3 4
Part I of this Note will examine the Klein decision and its modem
progeny and will argue that the rules deduced from Klein fail to pro-
vide a principled basis for decisions in this area. Part II suggests that
the Klein progeny reflects an unreasonably narrow conception of
courts' task in analyzing legislative intrusion into the province of the
judiciary. This Part then offers an alternative framework for under-
standing such legislation, incorporating "retroactivity" into the separa-
tion of powers analysis. Part III reconsiders the nineteenth century
precedents and contends that they afford support to the broader view
GLT, SACV 91-236-GLT, 1992 WL 388998 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 1992); Fred Hindler, Inc. v.
Telequest, Inc., No. CLV 89-0847, 1992 WL 158631 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 1992); First v. Pru-
dential Bache Sec. Inc., No. CIV 91-0047 H(M), 1991 WL 346367, (S.D. Cal. Mar. 24,
1992); In re Meldridge, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 87-1426-JU, 1992 WL 58265 (D. Or. Mar. 20,
1992); TGX Corp v. Simmons, 786 F. Supp. 587 (E.D. La. 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 997
F.2d 39 (5th Cir. 1993); TBG Inc. v. Bendis, No. CIV. A. 89-2423-0, 1992 WL 80622 (D.
Kan. Mar. 5, 1992); Venturtech II, Ltd v. Deloitte Haskins & Sells, 790 F. Supp. 574 (E.D.
N.C. 1992), affd, 993 F.2d 228 (4th Cir. 1993); Ayers v. Sutliffe, No. C-1-90-650, 1992 WL
207235 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 11, 1992); Bankard v. First Carolina Communications, Inc., No. 89
C 8571, 1992 WL 3694 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 6, 1992); Ash v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 806 F.
Supp. 1473 (E.D. Cal. 1992). But many others reached the opposite conclusion. See
Abrams & Wofsy v. Renaissance Inv. Corp., 820 F. Supp. 1519 (N.D. Ga. 1993); Rosenthal v.
Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 811 F. Supp. 562 (D. Colo. 1992), rev'd, 982 F.2d 529 (10th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2339 (1993); Dulude v. Cigna Sec. Inc., No. 90-CV-72191-DT,
1992 WL 281411 (E.D. Mich. May 14, 1992); In re Rospatch Sec. Litig., 802 F. Supp. 110
(W.D. Mich. 1992); In re Brichard Sec. Litig., 788 F. Supp. 1098 (N.D. Cal. 1992);Johnston
v. Cigna Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1098 (D. Colo. 1992), aftd on other grounds, 14 F.3d 486 (10th
Cir. 1993); Bank of Denver v. Southeastern Capital Group, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 1092 (D.
Colo. 1992); Mancino v. Int'l Technology Corp., No. 89-7244-RMT (SX), 1992 WL 114436
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 1992).
34 The opportunity seems ripe for two reasons. First, the Court appeared to reserve
precisely the question raised by § 27A in Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 112 S. Ct.
1407, 1415 (1992). Second, the Court has shown great interest in separation of powers
doctrine over the past decade. For example, the Court has shown increasing interest in
viewing standing as raising separation of powers questions. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,
751 (1984); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2144 (1992). For other exam-
ples of the Court's development of separation of powers doctrine, see Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (participation of federal judges in legislatively created sentenc-
ing panel not a violation of separation of powers); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988)
(independent counsel scheme not a violation of separation of powers); Bowsher v. Synar,
478 U.S. 714 (1986) (invalidating provisions of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act on sepa-
ration of powers ground); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833
(1986) (independent administrative hearings for state law counterclaims not violation of
Article III); I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (permitting an alien to challenge a
legislative veto of a decision suspending a deportation order against him because the veto
violated the separation of powers); Northern Pipeline Constr. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,
458 U.S. 50 (1982) (Congressional creation of bankruptcy courts without provision of life
tenure is a violation of Article III).
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advocated in the prior section. Drawing from these considerations,
Part IV formulates a test for resolving Klein-type questions and assesses
the constitutionality of section 27A under the proposed test.
I
UNITED STATES V. LA_7NAND ITS TROUBLED PROGENY
A. The Facts and Reasoning of United States v. Klein
During the Civil War, Congress enacted numerous laws concern-
ing the property seized from Southerners by the federal government
in the course of the war. An 1862 act enabled the government to
confiscate property held by persons aiding the rebellion. It also au-
thorized the President to issue a proclamation of pardon and amnesty
"at such times, and on such conditions as he should deem expedient"
to those who had aided in the rebellion.35 An 1863 statute, the Aban-
doned Property Collection Act, provided Treasury agents with the
power to seize and sell captured property and deposit the proceeds of
the sale into the United States Treasury.3 6 The 1863 Act further pro-
vided that the owners of seized property could seek compensation in
the United States Court of Claims by presenting proof of ownership
and proof that the owner had never "given any aid or comfort to the
present rebellion."37
On December 8, 1863, the President issued a proclamation of
pardon as provided for by the 1862 Act. The proclamation provided
that "a full pardon should be hereby granted ... , with restoration of
all rights of property" to those who shall "take and subscribe a pre-
scribed oath of allegiance, and thenceforward keep and maintain said
oath inviolate."38
On April 30, 1870, the Supreme Court rendered an opinion in
the case of United States v. Padelford.3 9 Padelford sought compensation
for cotton seized towards the conclusion of the war. The Court found
that Padelford had in fact aided the enemy by acting as a surety upon
the official bonds of officers in the rebel army.40 Nonetheless, the
Court found that Padelford was entitled to compensation because, de-
spite the statutory prohibition against compensating those who had
aided the rebellion, he had later received a pardon by taking a loyalty
oath pursuant to the December 1863 proclamation. 41 Thus, the
Court interpreted the 1863 statute as providing a remedy to both
35 K/in, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 131.
36 Id.
37 1&
38 Id. at 132.
39 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531 (1869).
40 Id. at 538.
41 Id. at 543.
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those who were actually loyal and those deemed to be loyal by virtue
of the pardon.
In the Klein case, the administrator for the estate of V.F. Wilson,
namely Klein, sought compensation for Wilson's cotton seized during
the war.42 When the Court of Claims first heard Klein's claim, it
found in his favor on the ground that there was no evidence of Wil-
son's disloyalty. 43 While the judgment awaited appeal to the Supreme
Court, new evidence emerged showing that Wilson had acted as a
surety on the bonds of two Confederate officers.44 The Court of
Claims heard the case anew after the Supreme Court had issued the
Padelford opinion. The parties stipulated to the evidence of disloyalty,
but the Court of Claims again ruled in Klein's favor based on a par-
don received by Wilson on February 15, 1864.45 As the case awaited
appeal to the Supreme Court, Congress sought to intervene.
Responding to Padelford and the Court of Claims judgment for
Klein, Congress attempted to undo the Supreme Court's decision by
passing the "1870 Proviso," as a rider to an appropriations measure. 46
In framing the legislation, Congress faced three obstacles. First, Con-
gress did not want to deny recovery against the government under the
1863 Act in toto.47 Second, Congress rightly suspected that the
Supreme Court would find that a change in the evidentiary value of
the pardon constituted an unconstitutional intrusion on the execu-
tive's pardon power.48 Third, Congress realized that a change in the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court would not disturb the Court of
Claims' judgment for Klein insofar as the Court of Claims was not
then perceived as an Article III court.49
Congress employed a two-pronged approach to overcome these
problems: (1) the 1870 Proviso changed the evidentiary requirements
for a finding of loyalty under the 1863 Act by deeming a pardon
unadmissible as evidence at trial or upon appeal, and stipulating that
proof of loyalty must show loyalty in fact; and (2) the 1870 Proviso
required that in cases where judgment was obtained by proof of loy-
alty based on a pardon, the Supreme Court shall have no jurisdiction
over the matter and shall dismiss the judgment for want of jurisdic-
42 Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 132.
43 SeeYoung, supra note 30, at 1199.
44 Id at 1199.
45 Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 132. SeeYoung, supra note 30, at 1199.
46 Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 133-34. This Note will not explore the separation of
powers issues arising from the passage of the 1870 Proviso as an appropriations measure.
47 See Young, supra note 30, at 1203-09.
48 Id
49 See Lawrence G. Sager, Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to
Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARv. L. Ray. 17, 72 (1981); but see Young,
supra note 30, at 1255.
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dion.50 By instructing the Court to dismiss the case, Congress thought
it had found a way to give the Supreme Court the power to dissolve
the Court of Claims judgment without giving the Supreme Court the
power to hear the government's appeal.5 1
As Congress anticipated, the Court ruled that the 1870 Proviso
was an unconstitutional violation of separation of powers because it
impaired "the effect of a pardon, and thus infring[ed] the constitu-
tional power of the Executive." 52 Having made this determination,
the Court had to address whether the second aspect of the 1870 Pro-
viso was a proper "exception" to or "regulation" of federal courtjuris-
50 The 1870 Proviso read as follows:
Prodded, That no pardon or amnesty granted by the President, whether
general or special, by proclamation or otherwise, nor any acceptance of
such pardon or amnesty, nor oath taken, or other act performed in pursu-
ance or as a condition thereof, shall be admissible in evidence on the part
of any claimant in the Court of Claims as evidence in support of any claim
against the United States, or to establish the standing of any claimant in
said court, or his right to bring or maintain suit therein; nor shall any such
pardon, amnesty, acceptance, oath, or other act as aforesaid, heretofore
offered or put in evidence on behalf of any claimant in said court, be used
or considered by said court, or by the appellate court on appeal from said
court, in deciding upon the claim of said claimant, or any appeal there-
from, as any part of the proof to sustain the claim of the claimant, or to
entitle him to maintain his action in said Court of Claims, or on appeal
therefrom; but the proof of loyalty required by the Abandoned and Cap-
tured Property Act, and by the sections of several acts quoted, shall be made
by proof of the matters required, irrespective of the effect of any executive
proclamation, pardon, amnesty, or other act of condonation or oblivion.
And in all cases where judgment shall have been heretofore rendered in
the Court of Claims in favor of any claimant, on any other proof of loyalty
than such as is above required and provided, and which is hereby declared
to have been and to be the true intent and meaning of said respective acts,
the Supreme Court shall, on appeal, have no further jurisdiction of the
cause, and shall dismiss the same for want ofjurisdiction.
And provided further, That whenever any pardon shall have heretofore
been granted by the President of the United States to any person bringing
suit in the Court of Claims for the proceeds of abandoned or captured
property under the said act, approved 12th March, 1863, and the acts
amendatory of the same, and such pardon shall recite in substance that
such person took part in the late rebellion against the government of the
United States, or was guilty of any act of rebellion against, or disloyalty to,
the United States; and such pardon shall have been accepted in writing by
the person to whom the same issued without an express disclaimer of, and
protestation against, such fact of guilt contained in such acceptance, such
pardon and acceptance shall be taken and deemed in such suit in the said
Court of Claims, and on appeal therefrom, conclusive evidence that such
person did take part in, and give aid and comfort to, the late rebellion, and
did not maintain true allegiance or consistently adhere to the United
States; and on proof of such pardon and acceptance, which proof may be
heard summarily on motion or otherwise, the jurisdiction of the court in
the case shall cease, and the court shall forthwith dismiss the suit of such
claimant.
quoted in Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 133-34.
51 See Young, supra note 30, at 1206-09.
52 Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 147.
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diction.53 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Chase found that the
1870 Proviso "inadvertently passed the limit which separates the legis-
lative from the judicial power."54
The passages in ChiefJustice Chase's opinion concerning legisla-
tive interference with the judicial power, which comprise barely two
pages, are not "model [s] of clarity."55 Chase began by stating the limits
of Congress' power to alter the jurisdiction of the federal courts.56 He
further noted that the "legislature has complete control over the or-
ganization and existence of [the Court of Claims] and may confer or
withhold the right of appeal from its decisions."5 7 From this proposi-
tion he concluded that, had the Act done nothing more than deny the
right of appeal, the 1870 Proviso would be unobjectionable.58
However, Chase explained, the purpose of the 1870 Proviso was
not to regulate jurisdiction, but to deny to "pardons granted by the
President the effect which [the Supreme Court] had adjudged them to
have."59 Rather than comprehensively revoking the Court's jurisdic-
tion over all actions arising under the 1863 Act, the 1870 Proviso
made jurisdiction turn on the discovery of a "certain state of things" 60
since jurisdiction only failed where the claim under the 1863 Act was
premised on a pardon. The 1870 Proviso provided that evidence of
loyalty based solely on the existence of a pardon, combined with a
judicial determination to give the constitutionally required effect to
the pardon, acted to defeat the Court's jurisdiction over the action.
Chase found that this was "not an exercise of the acknowledged power
of Congress to make exceptions and prescribe regulations to the ap-
pellate power."61
The actual holding of Klein is very narrow. In cases pending
before the Court, Congress may not condition the Court'sjurisdiction
to hear a matter on the Court's abstaining from applying certain con-
stitutional clauses in rendering its decision.6 2 This is a variation on
the challenge to section 27A resting on Beam: that Congress cannot
53 U.S. CONsT. art. HI, § 2.
54 Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 147.
55 See PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 369 (Sd ed. 1988).
56 Justice Chase had written the opinion in Ex parte McCardle a mere two years prior.
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868).
57 Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 145; see also Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506
(1868).
58 Could Congress have ordered the Court of Claims to rehear Klein's case in light of
the 1870 Proviso? Not according to the decision in Wheeling Bridge, in which the Court
held that Congress could not alter a court's judgment awarding costs in a finally adjudi-
cated action involving private rights. See infra note 219 and accompanying text.
59 Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 145.
60 Id. at 145-46.
61 Id. at 146.
62 SeeYoung, supra note 30, at 1223 n.179; BATOR ET AL, supra note 55, at 303.
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instruct the Court to conduct itself in a manner contrary to the Con-
stitution.63 As Congress cannot prescribe that the Court uphold an
unconstitutional law,64 Congress cannot condition the Court's juris-
diction on its giving effect to an unconstitutional statute. 65
ChiefJustice Chase, however, did not confine himself to this basic
principle, but sought to explain the source of this limitation on the
power of Congress to determine federal jurisdiction in the separation
of powers doctrine. Chase argued that the 1870 Proviso amounted to
nothing more than a legislative order to reach a particular conclusion
about an issue of law in pending cases.66 He asked rhetorically:
The court is required to ascertain the existence of certain facts and
thereupon to declare that its jurisdiction on appeal has ceased, by
dismissing the bill. What is this but to prescribe a rule for the deci-
sion of a cause in a particular way? . . .Can we [dismiss] without
allowing that the legislature may prescribe rules of decision to the
Judicial Department of the government in cases pending before
it?67
It seems unlikely that Chase intended to overrule the Changed
Law Rule since the case establishing that rule predated Klein by sev-
enty years.68 He may, however, have been seeking to carve out an
exception to it. The form of his argument clearly suggests this
possibility:
(i) It is self-evident that the legislature cannot prescribe a
rule of decision in cases pending before the judiciary without usurp-
ing the judicial function.
(ii) The legislature cannot do indirectly what it cannot do
directly.
(iii) The 1870 Proviso indirectly prescribes a rule of decision.
(iv) Therefore, the 1870 Proviso is a usurpation of the judicial
function.
The first premise suggests that we imagine a statute which reads
"in the case of X and Y now before the Court, the Court will decide
such and such." Faced with this premise, Chase argues that Congress
cannot tell the court what facts to find, what conclusions of law to
63 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
64 For example, suppose that Congress passed an unconstitutional national school
prayer act. Congress could not cure the constitutional problem by attaching a clause
which required the Court to deem the act constitutional. This is not because such a find-
ing would be an invasion of the fact finding function (the question is mixed law and fact),
but rather, because it is outside the power of Congress to change the law of the
Constitution.
65 See Sager, supra note 49, at 71-72; Henry M. Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the
Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. Rxv. 1362, 1373 (1963).
66 Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 146.
67 Id.
68 SchoonerPeggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801).
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reach, or what decision on the merits to issue. To make these sorts of
"judicial determinations" is to exercise judicial power. A bar against
such direct intrusions into the integrity of judicial process might still
appear consistent with the Changed Law Rule. However, once we fol-
low the second premise and accept indirect prescriptions of rules of
decision as sometimes invalid, a direct conflict with the Changed Law
Rule is created. An exceptionless Changed Law Rule dictates that, as
a general matter, Congress can change the rules of law that courts use
to renderjudgments in any pending cases. In doing so, however, Con-
gress indirectly alters the outcome of pending cases and thus indi-
rectly achieves control of the judiciary.
ThusJustice Chase seems to be suggesting that some indirections
are unacceptable and it would seem, despite the Changed Law Rule,
that changes in law fall within the class of such indirections. What
Chase needed to explain, but did not, is how to differentiate valid
from invalid members of the class of "indirect rule-prescriptions."6 9
B. The Kein Doctrine Prior to the Debate over Section 27A
As mentioned in the introduction, modern courts have offered
two rules for performing the sortinig problem left open by Justice
Chase's opinion in Klein:
(1) legislation is invalid if it prescribes a rule of decision in a
pending case without changing the underlying law (the "underlying
law exception"); and
(2) legislation is invalid if it mandates findings of fact on conclu-
sions of law (the "dictation of fact exception").
The purpose of this Section is to identify how these rules are em-
ployed and the difficulties that courts have had in applying them.
The dictation of fact exception was first articulated in the second
edition of Henry Hart and Herbert Wechsler's federal courts
casebook.70 In United States v. Brainer,71 the Sixth Circuit became the
first federal court to adopt the Hart and Wechsler criterion. This sec-
69 It is interesting to note, however, that Congress had the last word, as the Court later
held that Congress need not appropriate funds due to pardoned persons. Hart v. United
States, 118 U.S. 62, 66 (1886). See STANLEY I. KuTLER, JUDICIAL POWER AND RECONsTRUC-
TION PoLrIcs 118 (1968).
70 See BATOR, ET AL, supra note 55, at 369 n.4.
71 691 F.2d 691 (1982). The issue in Brainer concerned the constitutionality of the
Speedy Trial Act of 1972. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174. Under the Speedy Trial Act, defendants
had to be tried within 70 days from whichever came first: the date of the indictment or the
date the defendant first appeared before the court where the charge was pending.
Although Brainer's trial date exceeded the seventy day limit, the district court denied
Brainer's motion to dismiss, relying on a version of Klein's underlying law exception. It
found that the Speedy Trial Act usurped the judicial power by determining the "actual
substantive outcome of individual criminal cases" without a change in the underlying sub-
stantive law of the crime. 515 F. Supp. 627, 636 (D.Md. 1981). The district court also
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tion examines a series of decisions in the Ninth Circuit that attempted
to follow the rule articulated in Brainer. Examining the decisions of
the Ninth Circuit reveals the first practical problem of the Klein rules:
even when rigorously applied, the rules provide a hollow source of
protection for the judiciary because they are easy to legislate around.
The discussion then turns to the recent Supreme Court decision in
Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society.72 A comparison of the Supreme
Court's application of the Klein rules with that of the Ninth Circuit
reveals the second practical problem: the outcome yielded by the
rules is entirely a function of how the court chooses to characterize
the legislation at issue-a choice unbounded by any principle.7 3
found that the Act was "an unwarranted intrusion into the administration of the judicial
system." Id.
The Sixth Circuit rejected the district court's formulation of the rule, adopting the
dictation of fact language suggested in the second edition of HART AND WECHSLER'S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM. The court wrote that
the better reading of Klein is quite narrow and construes the case as holding
only that Congress violated the separation of powers when it presumes to
dictate 'how the Court should decide an issue of fact (under the threat of
loss of jurisdiction)' and purports 'to bind the Court to decide a case in
accordance with a rule of law independently unconstitutional on other
grounds.'
691 F.2d at 695 (emphasis added) (quoting PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYsrEM 316 (2d ed. 1973)).
Thus, the court adopts a two-prong reading of Kein, which provides that legislation is
unconstitutional only if it both (a) falls within the dictation of fact exception and (b) is
independently unconstitutional. On these facts, the court argued that the Speedy Trial Act
"lays down [no] rules of decision," but only "rules of practice and procedure." Brainer, 691
F.2d at 695. Such rules are within the province of the legislature, as evidenced by Con-
gress's passage of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 695-96. Interestingly, the
court specifically analogizes the type of procedural law embodied in the Speedy Trial Act
to a statute of limitations:
Statutes of limitations provide perhaps the closest analogy. Few would sug-
gest that such statutes intrude upon the judiciary's substantive decisional
role. The suggestion rings just as hollow when applied to the time limits
and dismissal sanction of the Speedy Trial Act, which dispose of cases solely
on the procedural ground of undue delay and without regard to the guilt of
innocence of the accused.
Id at 696.
It might appear that the holding of the case is that legislation is proper so long as it
changes the underlying substantive or procedural or quasi-procedural law. Notice, how-
ever, that Brainer should not invoke Klein at all. First, the Speedy Trial Act was in place
prior to the commencement of Brainer's prosecution, while the court's concern in Klein
was the effect of legislation on pending litigation. Second, the issue in Brainer is not the
power of the legislature to affect outcomes (any procedural rule, as the Sixth Circuit
noted, may do this), but the propriety of condoning legislative control of court administra-
tion. Klein may offer some guidance for adjudicating this question, but it does not enumer-
ate a rule for its determination.
72 112 S. Ct. 1407 (1992).
73 See Professor Ronner's article infra note 266, at 1048-55 (offering a similar critique
of the Ninth Circuit and Robertson decisions).
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1. The Ninth Circuit Decisions
The Ninth Circuit first subscribed to the dictation of fact excep-
tion in In re Consolidated United States Atmospheric Testing Litigation.74
The plaintiffs in that case brought suit against several government
contractors in an effort to recover damages for injuries arising from
radiation exposure during nuclear testing. While the action was
pending, Congress passed a law mandating that the plaintiff's exclu-
sive remedy was to sue the United States under the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA). The legislation effectively restricted the scope of
any potential recovery by the plaintiffs.
The adoption of the dictation of fact exception greatly simplified
the court's analysis.75 Because the legislation did not mandate any
particular determination of fact with respect to the existence, cause,
or extent of the injury, it did not violate the exception.
Although the legislation did not mandate the outcome of claims
brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act, it clearly mandated the
outcome of other claims that the plaintiffs might have brought. Had
the court adopted the underlying law exception, it would have had to
answer the more difficult question of whether depriving the plaintiffs
of these claims constituted a substantive change in law. 76 In other
words, the court would have needed to explore whether the limitation
of the remedy was permissible as a change in the underlying substan-
tive law of tort, or whether it was impermissible as an ad hoc restric-
tion of the rights of the plaintiffs that left tort law unchanged.77
The next case to consider is Seattle Audubon v. Robertson.78 This
case involved section 318 of the Department of the Interior and Re-
lated Agencies Appropriations Act of 1990 (The "Northwest Timber
74 820 F.2d 982 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 905 (1988).
75 The Ninth Circuit later modified its position in Seattle Audubon v. Robertson, 914
F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1407 (1992). It determined that the proper
standard under Kdn is disjunctive, not conjunctive, and that Congress may not dictate how
the court should decide an issue of fact or require the court to decide a case in accordance
with a rule of law that is independently unconstitutional. Seattle Audubon, 914 F.2d at 1315.
The opinion is curious. The court states that the disjunctive standard was adopted in
Grimsey v. Huff, 876 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1989), but that case merely raised the question
without deciding it. The court also appears oblivious to the fact that, in Grimsey, it recog-
nized that the most recent edition of HART & WECHSLER had withdrawn its support for the
proposition that the dictation of fact exception is attributable to Klein. Furthermore, citing
United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians to support a disjunctive reading is inapposite.
While it is true thatJustice Blackmun's opinion supports a disjunctive reading, the disjunc-
tion is between the underlying law exception and the type of corollary rule set forth in the
Beam line of arguments against § 27A's constitutionality. 448 U.S. 371, 404-05 (1980).
76 The differences between the tests applied by the district court and the circuit court
are enumerated in Brainer, supra note 71.
77 The general relationship to due process concerns should be noted. By segregating
out radiation victims from the general class of tort plaintiffs, Congress altered governmen-
tal tort liability without affecting tort plaintiffs generally.
78 914 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1987).
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Compromise"), which was environmental legislation enacted specifi-
cally to undermine two pending actions in the Pacific Northwest. The
pending litigation challenged proposed timber sales on grounds that
they failed to comply with the requirements of the National Environ-
mental Protection Act (NEPA) and other environmental statutes. Sec-
tion 318 legislatively declared that the Environmental Impact
Statement filed in conjunction with timber sales satisfied the require-
ments of NEPA and the other statutes, thereby purporting to elimi-
nate the basis for challenging the timber sales at issue in the pending
litigation.
The Ninth Circuit groped for a way to assess whether the dicta-
tion of fact exception applied. Ultimately, it interpreted the rule in a
way that simply restated the underlying law exception:
[T] he critical distinction, for purposes of deciding the limits of Con-
gress' authority to affect pending litigation through statute, is be-
tween the actual repeal or amendment of the law .... which is
permissible, and the actual direction of a particular decision in a
case, without repealing or amending the law underlying the litiga-
tion, which is not permissible.79
Although the dictation of fact exception looked like a means for clari-
fying the law/nonlaw distinction in Atmospheric Testing, the Seattle Au-
dubon court reverted to relying on the underlying law exception as a
means of assessing whether legislation dictates facts.
The court held that, because the legislation did not exempt the
acreage from NEPA, it did not change the underlying law and so the
legislation dictated a "finding of fact." According to Seattle Audubon,
in order for a court to find that a party has complied with NEPA, it
must find that the Secretary of the Interior has "used the principles of
multiple use and sustained yield" in his management of the public
land and that "detailed statements of detrimental effects" had been
met. Under section 318, the court is instructed to find that these fac-
tual predicates have been met regardless of the truth of the matter.
In reaching its decision in Seattle Audubon, the court distinguished
Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Dole.80 In Stop H-3, the Ninth Circuit held that a fed-
eral appropriations bill that had specifically exempted a highway pro-
ject from compliance with environmental laws was constitutional.81
79 Id. at 1315.
80 870 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir. 1989).
81 See id. at 1437-38. Since Stop H-3 was decided after Atmospheric Testing, it is curious
that the Ninth Circuit did not employ the underlying law exception in deciding the case.
In finding that the highway project exemption was not unconstitutional, the Stop H-3 court
observed:
Nor did Congress perform a judicial' function in exempting H-3 from sec-
tion 4(f). Congress, in enacting laws, may rest its policy decisions on 'fac-
tual' determination, including determinations concerning the relationship
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The Seattle Audubon court reasoned that the exemption actually
changed the underlying law in Stop H-3.8 2 The upshot of this distinc-
tion is that the legislation in Seattle Audubon would have been constitu-
tional if only Congress had specifically exempted the public lands
from federal and state environmental regulations rather than "deem-
ing" that such regulations were satisfied. In other words, the Ninth
Circuit's understanding of separation of powers principles would al-
low Congress to enact legislation that serves solely to alter the out-
come of pending litigation, so long as the "proper" form is followed.8 3
This trio of cases demonstrates two problems. First, the attempt
to categorize legislation on the basis of these tests engenders no clear
criteria. Second, neither version of the Klein doctrine imposes a
meaningful limit on congressional power because Congress can always
present its rules of decisions in the guise of "exemptions."8 4
of facts to preexisting law. Thus the Conference Committee's expression of
its view that the H-3 project satisfied the requirements of the 4(f) statutes
... does not represent 'adjudication' by Congress but rather the legitimate
result of investigation and analysis upon which legislative decisions are
based.
870 F.2d at 1438.
The court treated the highway project exemption as eliminating federal courtjurisdic-
tion to hear the claim. See id. at 1437. It then distinguished Klin by noting that Kein
stands for the proposition that Congress cannot give federal courts the power to hear a
matter and then instruct them to dismiss it should they find certain facts. See id. at 1437
n.26.
82 See Seattle Audubon, 914 F.2d at 1316-17.
83 Although the Ninth Circuit did not make the argument, the court might have
sought to justify the distinction by arguing that the type of legislation at issue in Stop H-3
allows Congress to diminish its political accountability. For example, a law which simply
exempts the highway project from complying with environmental regulations would
render the effect of congressional action more understandable and more visible to the
public. Section 318, in contrast, obscures the action of Congress by seemingly replacing
the relevant environmental regulations with new ones. Such an action injures the separa-
tion of powers doctrine in two ways. First, it undermines the structural integrity of the
tripartite system because political accountability is an essential check on the abuse of legis-
lative powers. Second, it injures the independence and institutional integrity of thejudici-
ary because it manipulates the courts. See Robert H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive
Harns, "Bizarre Districts, "and Voting Rights: EvaluatingElection-Distrit Appearances AfterShow
v. Reno, 92 MicH. L REv. 483, 520 (1993) (arguing that many constitutional decisions find
the form of state action impermissible, while noting that the state may constitutionally
reach the same ends by other means).
The Seattle Audubon controversy, however, identifies two problems with the proposed
argument. First, the media was not fooled by the form of the Congressional Act. Second,
the legislation kept some limits on agency action that were important to Congress. An
exemption might have given the agency a free hand. Moreover, the argument simply is
not the one that the Ninth Circuit made. Instead, the Seattle Audubon court contended that
the distinction rested upon the impropriety of congressional attempts to manipulate the
judicial process of reaching an outcome, rather than the particular outcome itself. See 914
F.2d at 1316-17.




2. The Supreme Court's Reversal of the Ninth Circuit's Seattle
Audubon Decision
In Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society,85 the Supreme Court unani-
mously repudiated the Ninth Circuit's determination that section 318
dictated a finding of fact and failed to change the underlying law.
Justice Thomas, writing for the Court, reasoned that after the enact-
ment of section 318 the state of law was such that the Bureau of Land
Management could satisfy its environmental obligations either by con-
forming to the requirements of the underlying statute (e.g., NEPA) or
by conforming to the requirements of section 318.86 Given this char-
acterization of section 318, the Court easily found that section 318
changed the underlying substantive environmental laws governing the
public lands in question.87 The Court depicts section 318 as a sepa-
rate law establishing distinct environmental requirements, whereas
the Ninth Circuit views the provision as an addendum to substantive
environmental legislation which limits judicial determinations under
the existing law.
The tripartite conception of adjudication advocated by Henry
Hart and Albert Sack offers an explanation for the disharmony of the
Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court approaches.88 Under this theory of
adjudication, courts engage in law declaring,8 9 fact finding,90 and law
application. 91 The Ninth Circuit determined that a court would find
the governing rules embodied in the existing substantive law, such as
the MBTA. Under the Ninth Circuit approach, section 318 enters
into the adjudicative process when the court applies the governing
rule to its factual determinations. For example, under this approach a
Court would consider the effect of the management plan on the spot-
ted owl habitat. Thus, because section 318 deemed that the manage-
ment plan satisfied the governing rule regardless of the actual factual
determination, the Ninth Circuit interpreted it as displacing the law
[The legislature's] constitutional powers being at once more extensive, and
less susceptible of precise limits, it can, with the greater facility, mask,
under complicated and indirect measures, the encroachments which it
makes on the co-ordinate departments. It is not unfrequently a question of
real nicety in legislative bodies whether the operation of a particular mea-
sure will, or will not, extend beyond the legislative sphere.
THE FEDERALiST PAPERS No. 48 at 310 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
85 112 S. Ct. 1407 (1992).
86 See id. at 1413.
87 See id.
88 HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PRocEss: BAsic PROBLEMS IN
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 869-86 (1958).
89 The judgment of the court as to the legal rules which govern the outcome of the
dispute. See id. at 374.
90 The determination of the facts giving rise to the dispute. See id. at 375.
91 The application of the governing law to found facts. See id.
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application stage of adjudication. In contrast, the Supreme Court rea-
soned that section 318 emerges at the earlier law determination stage.
How should a court ascertain the stage of the adjudicative process
at which section 318 operates? In response to the Ninth Circuit's ob-
servation that, under the language of section 318, the management
plan is "deemed" to be in compliance with other laws, Justice Thomas
wrote:
We fail to appreciate the significance of this observation. Congress
might have modified MBTA directly, for example, in order to im-
pose a new obligation of complying either with the current § 2 [of
the MBTA] or with [§ 318]. Instead, Congress enacted an entirely
separate statute deeming compliance with [§ 318] to constitute com-
pliance with § 2-a "modification" of the MBTA, we conclude,
through operation of the canon that specific provisions qualify gen-
eral ones. As explained above, each formulation would have pro-
duced an identical task for a court adjudicating the MBTA claims-
determining either that the challenged harvesting did not violate
§ 2 as currently written or that it did not violate [§ 318].92
Justice Thomas's claim appears to be that since Congress could have
modified the MBTA directly-and since the effect on the court's pro-
cess is the same-the Court will treat section 318 as if it had done so.
This reasoning turns the Ninth Circuit's effort to distinguish Seattle
Audubon from Stop H-3 on its head. As Congress could have exempted
the public land from the MBTA with the same effect, section 318
ceases to be a cause for concern.
The efforts of the Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit are not in-
spiring. On the one hand, the Ninth Circuit's reasoning implies that
the separation of powers doctrine amounts to nothing more than a
restraint on the manner in which Congress drafts laws that affect
pending litigation.93 But is the separation of powers such a weak
doctrine that it merely regulates the form of legislation and not its
substance?94 On the other hand, the Supreme Court's analysis appar-
ently calls for an inevitably fruitless search for legislation that dictates
92 Robertson, 112 S. Ct. at 1414 (citation omitted).
93 Nevertheless, the form of legislation illustrates something about the legislative pro-
cess that gave rise to it. Since an exemption would have been more straight-forward, it is
unclear why Congress did not follow this route.
94 The Ninth Circuit's view of separation of powers finds support, however, in Gerald
Gunther's discussion of the power of Congress to limit the jurisdiction of the Court. Gun-
ther contends that revocation ofjurisdiction over a matter is always legitimate. See Gerald
Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the
Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. Rxv. 895, 908 (1984). See also Martin H. Redish, Congressional
Power to Regulate Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction Under the Exceptions Clause: An Internal
and External Examination, 27 ViLt. L. REv. 900, 911 (1982) (arguing that Congress has
broad power to limit the jurisdiction of the federal judiciary).
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fact.95 One might suspect that the courts simply use the doctrine in
an ad hoc manner to achieve the results they desire.96
This Note defers the resolution of these questions until later,97
but at this juncture it is important to recognize that Robertson does not
foreclose such inquiry. Although the Robertson Court accepted the
Ninth Circuit's adoption of the underlying law exception for the pur-
pose of reviewing the Ninth Circuit's decision, the Court explicitly
stated that its opinion did not address the general question of the
proper constitutional standard.98 It noted that an amicus brief chal-
lenging the Ninth Circuit's standard suggested that "a change in law,
prospectively applied, would be unconstitutional if the change swept
no more broadly, or little more broadly, than the range of applica-
tions at issue in the pending cases."99 The Court, however, chose not
to address the merits of this suggestion, reasoning that the issue was
not raised by the Ninth Circuit or the respondent.100 If the Court was
indeed signaling that it is prepared to reconsider the separation of
powers jurisprudence in this area, then, as discussed below,101 many
defendants in section 27A cases have been remiss in falling to argue
for a different approach.
95 In Gray v. First Winthrop Corp., 989 F.2d 1564 (9th Cir. 1993), a Ninth Circuit
panel implied an alternative understanding of Robertson, namely that Klein simply has no
continuing vitality. With a tone of resignation, the court wrote:
Robertson indicates a high degree ofjudicial tolerance for an act of Congress
that is intended to affect litigation so long as it changes the underlying
substantive law in any detectable way. Because Section 27A more clearly
and directly changes the underlying substantive law than the appropriation
"rider" upheld in Robertson, section 27A amply passes whatever is left of the
Klein tesL
989 F.2d at 1569-70 (emphasis added). In Section II.B. infra, the Note argues that such an
outcome is contrary to the principles underlying the separation of powers doctrine.
96 Philip Kurland, for example, has suggested that "[t]he ancient concept of separa-
tion of powers and checks and balances has been reduced to a slogan, to be trotted out by
the Supreme Court from time to time as a substitute for a reasonedjudgment." PHHUp B.
KuRAND, WATERGATE AND THE CONSTrUTION 179 (1978).
97 See discussion infra part V.
98 The Court wrote:
We have no occasion to address any broad question of Article In jurispr-
dence. The Court of Appeals held that subsection (b) (6) (a) was unconsti-
tutional under Klein because it directed decisions in pending cases without
amending any law. Because we conclude that subsection (b) (6) (a) did
amend applicable law, we need not consider whether this reading of Klein is
correct.
Robertson, 112 S. Ct. at 1414.
99 Id. at 1415.
100 Id.
101 See discussion infra part IV.
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C. The Errant Efforts of the District Courts in Deciding the
Constitutionality of Section 27A
Inconsistent results among federal district courts concerning the
constitutionality of section 27A are primarily the product of disagree-
ment over characterization of section 27A as a change in the underly-
ing law. 102 For example, the district court in Bankard v. First Carolina
Communications, Inc.10 3 explained that section 27A changed the law,
and that appearances to the contrary arise "only because instead of
delineating fully the change of law, Congress has made the change by
reference, incorporating the prevailing law in the applicable jurisdic-
tion."10 4 Thus far, the federal appeals courts have unanimously
agreed with this analysis.' 0 5 In contrast, the district court in In re
Brichard Securities Litigation found that "Congress did not change the
statute of limitations announced in Lampf Congress only changed
the retroactive effect of the statute of limitations announced in
Lampf"106 The rather conclusory analyses of both the Bankard and
Brichard courts are characteristic of the decisions addressing the issue.
The lower courts have, by and large, treated the underlying law
exception as the operative rule for determining the constitutionality
of section 27A.107 This subpart identifies and critiques the three prin-
cipal arguments that have been employed to advance the claim that
section 27A changes law in a manner consistent with Klein: the incor-
poration argument, the purpose argument and the mere waiver of a
technical defense argument. 08
102 For a list of cases, see supra note 33.
103 Bankard v. First Carolina Communications, Inc., No. 89-8571, 1992 WL 3694 (N.D.
III. Jan. 6, 1992).
104 id. at *6.
105 See supra note 25. For a discussion and criticism of the circuit court opinions, see
Ronner, infra note 266, at 1061-65.
106 In re Brichard Sec. Litig., 788 F. Supp. 1098, 1103 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
107 See Axel Johnson, Inc. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 790 F. Supp. 476, 479 (S.D.N.Y.
1992), af'd, 6 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 1993); see also In re Brichard Sec. Litig., 788 F. Supp. 1098,
1102 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (the application of retroactive legislation to pending cases "presup-
pose [s] a substantive or procedural change in law made by Congress"). Indeed, one district
courtjudge has observed that"[t]here is considerable dispute ... as to how broadly Kein is
to be read. The exact scope of Klein need not be resolved, however, because even under
[defendant's] broad reading, Kein is not applicable where the legislation under review es-
tablishes a new and generally applicable rule." AxelJohnson, 790 F. Supp. at 479.
108 Given the large number of decisions that have come down in the past two years, see
supra notes 25 and 33, this subpart does not attempt to summarize all the decisions; nor
would such an exercise be particularly useful, given their redundancy. Instead, this section
attempts to identify the various arguments that the courts have offered for and against the
constitutionality of § 27A.
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1. The Incorporation Argument
Courts that find section 27A to be constitutional reason that,
although the provision does not explicitly change the statute of limita-
tions for Section 10(b) actions by prescribing a specific number of
years, it does alter the limitations period by incorporating pre-Lampf
law (call this the "incorporation argument"). 109 Courts ruling that
section 27A is unconstitutional offer two types of responses.
The first, the purely retrospective response, denies that section
27A changed the statute of limitations for section 10(b) actions inso-
far as the one/three Lampfscheme still survives to govern in all future
cases.110 According to this approach, changing the statute of limita-
tions in only a retrospective manner is not the same as changing the
"underlying substantive or procedural rule."''
The challenge that the purely retrospective response offers can-
not be resolved within the framework of analysis supplied by the un-
derlying law exception. The underlying law exception places the
legislation within the judicial decisionmaking process and defines
what counts as "changed law." Retroactivity concerns, however, do
not fit within this framework. Rather, the question of how broadly or
narrowly Congress must address a subject matter when enacting legis-
lation with the specific purpose of affecting pending litigation de-
pends on one's understanding, of the principles and policies
underlying the separation of powers.
That pure retroactivity is the central concern, and that the under-
lying law exception obscures this fact, is demonstrated by the differen-
tial treatment given by the courts to a common premise: that
Congress could constitutionally have changed the statute of limita-
tions for section 10(b) and explicitly given that change in law retroac-
109 See e.g., Adler v. Berg Harmon Assocs., 790 F. Supp. 1235, 1243 (S.D.N.Y. 1992);
Bankard v. First Carolina Communications, Inc., No. 89-C8571, 1992 WL 3694, at *5 (N.D.
Ill. Jan. 6, 1992); Rabin v. Fivzar Assocs., 801 F. Supp. 1045, 1053-54 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
110 A second, more oblique argument supporting the retrospective response, is that
Congress did not provide a rule of law, but rather declared that a rule of law-Lampf-may
not be applied. See, e.g., In re Brichard Sec. Litig., 788 F. Supp. 1098, 1104 (N.D. Cal. 1992)
("Congress stated what rule may not be applied, even though it did not enact a substantive
or procedural law."). This claim has two pitfalls. First, the statute does provide some posi-
tive reference as to what the applicable law should be because it refers to the law prevailing
in the circuits prior to Lampf It seems unlikely that the district court in Brichard would be
any more receptive to a law which provided a purely retroactive ten year statute of limita-
tions. Nevertheless, such a law would satisfy the court's requirement. Second, it is not
obvious why Congress cannot declare that a particular rule of law constructed by the courts
shall not govern without providing a substantive alternative. Suppose, for example, that
the legislature deemed that contributory negligence was grossly unfair, but also felt that
the proper method of adjusting the doctrine would be to let the common law try again.
Ill See, e.g., Bank of Denver v. Southeastern Capital Group, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 1092,
1097 (D. Colo. 1992); Abrams & Wofsy v. Renaissance Inv. Corp., 820 F. Supp. 1519, 1525
(N.D. Ga. 1993); In re Brichard Sec. Litig., 788 F. Supp. 1098, 1103 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
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five effect The district court in AxelJohnson, Inc. v. Arthur Andersen &
Co., for example, interpreted this premise to mean that Congress in-
deed changes the law even when it chooses to do so retrospectively."12
On the other hand, the district court in Bank of Denver v. Southeastern
Capital Group Inc. took the view that Congress' capacity to check the
judiciary by making a wholesale change in the statute of limitations
does not foreclose the conclusion that a partial change is invalid."13
These differing views result in a stalemate so long as the question of
whether section 27A itself counts as a change in law remains
unanswered.
The second response to the incorporation argument offered by
courts finding section 27A unconstitutional, the "intepretivist re-
sponse," reasons that the change infringes on a court's interpretive
task because it tells courts how to interpret the statute of limitations-
namely, to ignore Lampf and apply the prior circuit rulings-rather
than giving courts a rule to apply. 1 4 The court in Bank of Denver ar-
gued that such a prescription is inappropriate under the separation of
powers doctrine, since it is the province of the judiciary to determine
what and how rules of law should be applied to a particular case. 11.5
Comparing section 27A to the statute in Klein, the court noted that
"[iun both instances, the prescribed interpretation was at odds with
prior Supreme Court law."116
The interpretivist response is problematic in two respects. First,
Klein is distinguishable insofar as that case involved the interpretation
112 AxelJohnson, Inc. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 790 F. Supp. 476, 479-80 (S.D.N.Y.
1992), affd, 6 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 1993). Note the use of the term "retrospective" here. It
refers to the time of filing rather than the time of the cause of action. Section 27A does
not alter the statute of limitations for causes of action arising prior to Lampf. It only im-
pacts actions filed prior to Lampf. The fact that those who have lost actions by failing to file
prior to Lampfshare the same reliance interests as those who would have lost actions but
for § 27A seemingly did not concern Congress. The Seventh Circuit treats the notion of
retroactivity in the context of new limitations periods in a similar manner. See McCool v.
Strata Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1452, 1459-60 (7th Cir. 1992).
113 Bank of Denver, 789 F. Supp. at 1097:
If Congress' purpose was to change the law, it could have enacted a retroac-
tive express statute of limitations or made § 476 applicable to all cases re-
gardless of whether they were filed on or before June 19, 1991. Instead, by
selecting a discrete body of pending actions for special treatment under
§ 476, Congress demonstrated that its sole purpose was to nullify the
Supreme Court's interpretation of§ 10(b) without amending § 10(b) itself.
In so doing, Congress usurped the power set aside to the judiciary by the
Constitution.
114 Id. at 1097 ("[Section] 476 prescribes an interpretive rule that, in any civil action
implied under § 10(b), the limitations period would be the period applicable in the juris-
diction onJune 19, 1991."). The proposition that § 27A only tells Courts what rule not to
apply is a variation on this point. In re Brichard Sec. Litig., 788 F. Supp. 1098 (N.D. Cal.
1992).
115 See Bank of Denver, 789 F. Supp. at 1097-98 (D. Colo. 1992).
116 Id. at 1097.
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of the Constitution's Pardon Clause, whereas the issue presented here
is one of statutory interpretation. Second, the interpretivist claim
begs the question. Section 27A only prescribes interpretation if it fails
to effect a legitimate change in law, but, it is precisely the conclusion
of the incorporation argument that it effects such a change. Thus, the
debate continues to revolve around two contradictory presumptions
for which no second level of recourse exists.
The invocation of Robertson by courts interpreting section 27A
takes them through yet another rondel. On the one hand, courts rely-
ing on Robertson" 7 are wrong to regard it as dispositive for the section
27A cases. The issue in Robertson was whether the locus of the legisla-
tive intrusion occurred at the fact-finding or the law-declaring stage of
the process." 8 To the extent that section 27A raises adjudicative pro-
cess concerns at all, the issue in the section 27A cases rests on a dis-
tinction between types of effects at the law declaring stage." 9
On the other hand, courts distinguishing Robertson similarly go
awry. The district court in Johnston v. Cigna Corp., for example, at-
tempted to distinguish Robertson on the ground that section 318 re-
wrote a legislatively created law, whereas section 27A involved the
alteration of a rule derived from a Supreme Court decision.120 Given
that the question is whether section 27A changes law, it is unclear
what relevance the legislative or judicial origin of prior law has with
regard to the determination of section 27A's status as law or nonlaw.
To legislatively alter a judge-made law is no less an alteration of law
than the modification of a statute.' 21 The bottom line is that Robertson
simply does not offer an answer to the law-nonlaw conundrum raised
by section 27A. 22
117 See; e.g., Henderson v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 971 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1992) (rely-
ing on Robertson for the proposition that § 27A changed the law), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 95
(1993); Fry v. UAL Corp., No. 90 C 0999, 1992 WL 177086 (N.D. Ill. July 23, 1992).
118 See Robertson, 112 S. Ct. at 1412-13.
119 Reading the interpretation argument in the most generous light, the claim is that
§ 27A preempts the law-declaring stage by dictating how the court should determine what
law governs (i.e., telling the courts not to refer to Lampi, rather than providing a new
substantive law.
120 The Johnston court argued that in Robertson "Congress rewrote its own statutory
framework. In stark contrast, § 476 attempts to overturn a decision of the Supreme Court
interpreting the unchanged language of section 10(b)." Johnston v. Cigna Corp., 789 F.
Supp. 1098, 1102 (D. Colo. 1992), afl'd on other grounds, 14 F.3d 486 (10th Cir. 1993),
petition for cert. filed, 62 U.S.L.W. 3757 (U.S. May 2, 1994) (No. 93-1723). The contrast is
clear, but it is hardly stark.
121 As noted above, supra notes 96 to 98 and accompanying text, Robertson does not
endorse the underlying law exception. It merely holds that, if the exception is the law, the
Ninth Circuit misapplied it. The question that § 27A really raises is whether congressional
alteration of the law in a manner that only affects pending litigation offends the separation
of powers doctrine.
122 The Eleventh Circuit rejected defendant's suggestion that Robertson be distin-
guished on the ground that it involved legislation with a prospective and retrospective
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In sum, the problem is not whether section 27A changes law, but
whether the separation of powers doctrine permits this type of change
in law. This is not a question that the courts can answer by classifying
section 27A as a change or not a change in the law.
2. The Legislative Purpose Argument
In In re Brichard Securities Litigation, the district court argues at
length that the sole motive of Congress in passing section 27A was to
affect the outcome of pending litigation, especially the outcome of a
few cases involving highly visible defendants. 23 Thus, the Brichard
court held section 27A unconstitutional under the Klein prohibi-
tion.124 Other authorities have offered three alternative interpreta-
tions of section 27A's legislative purpose. First, Congress might not
have acted to affect any particular litigation, but rather to protect the
reliance interests of plaintiffs in a broad class of cases.125 Second, an
inquiry into legislative motive might not be appropriate in section 27A
cases. 126 Third, a purpose to affect pending litigation might not
render legislation invalid under the separation of powers doctrine so
long as the affected litigants are treated as a class.127
While the purpose argument may be a legitimate ground for at-
tacking section 27A, we need to recognize that it is irrelevant to the
underlying law exception. Purpose constitutes a criterion for deter-
mining the propriety of section 27A that is external to the classifica-
tion of the point at which the legislation intervenes in the adjudicative
process. The purpose at issue is Congress' desire to alter outcomes in
pending litigation, not Congress' goal of telling judges what to do.
3. The Mere Waiver of a Technical Defense Argument
Another external criterion that has been introduced as support
for section 27A's constitutionality is the claim that it is procedural and
effect, whereas § 27A only has a retrospective effect. See Henderson v. Scientific-Atlanta,
Inc., 971 F.2d 1567, 1573 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. dna, 114 S. Ct. 95 (1993) (arguing that
"[t]he presence of an additional prospective effect in no way lessens interference" with
judicial decisionmaking). This conclusion seems correct as long as it is limited to the con-
fines of the legal process framework. However, it does not answer the question that the
Supreme Court reserves in Robertson, namely whether some other considerations might be
relevant to the issue of intrusion on judicial power.
123 In re Brichard Sec. Litig., 788 F. Supp. 1098, 1105-06 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
124 See id. at 1105, 1112.
125 Axel Johnson, Inc., v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 790 F. Supp. 476, 483 (S.D.N.Y.
1992), affd 6 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 1993).
126 Id. at 480.




technical in nature.128 For example, a Tenth Circuit panel considers
the constitutionality of section 27A in the following manner:
In enacting Section 27A, Congress exercised a key legislative power.
Statutes of limitations traditionally reside in the legislative branch
.... In this sense, our case more closely resembles United States v.
Sioux Nation of Indians, in which the Court affirmed Congress' power
to enact legislation waiving the resjudicata defense of a priorjudge-
ment [sic]. "Legislation to alter such a technical defense, and its
application even to dismissed cases, goes far less to the heart of the
judicial function than would a legislative attempt to reverse adjudi-
cations which had addressed the true merits of the disputes in
question."' 29
Looking to the subject matter of the legislation, the panel found that
section 27A was constitutional because its application only served to
reverse adjudications on technical grounds.'3 0 However, the panel's
reliance on United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians'3 ' is inappropriate.
That case dealt with legislation waiving an affirmative defense that
otherwise would have been available to the government.132 Conse-
quently, the government affected only its own rights by passing the
legislation. Section 27A, by contrast, compromises the rights of pri-
vate defendants. Moreover, a consideration of subject matter is irrele-
vant to whether the legislation falls within the underlying law
exception.
Nonetheless, there may be merit to the suggestion that the sub-
ject of the legislation should be a factor in the separation of powers
analysis. Part IV considers this point in greater detail.133
128 See, e.g., Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 977 F.2d 1533, 1546 (10th Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1841 (1993); Fry v. UAL Corp., No. 90 C 0999, 1992 WL 177086, at
*13 (N.D. Ill. July 23, 1992).
129 Anixter, 977 F.2d at 1546 (citation omitted) (quoting Axel Johnson, Inc. v. Arthur
Andersen & Co., 790 F. Supp. 476, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aft'd; 6 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1993)).
130 The analysis is akin to Judge Lasker's "hallmarks of legislation" argument. In Axel
Johnson, Judge Lasker suggests that the propriety of § 27A can be determined by noting
that it bears the "hallmarks of legislation." 790 F. Supp. at 479. As a general matter, the
suggestion steers us toward practical criteria for determining whether § 27A violates sepa-
ration of powers principles. The criterion offered by Judge Lasker, however, proves to be
unhelpful. The only characteristic that Lasker cites as indicative of § 27A's legislative char-
acter is that it deals with a subject matter-statutes of limitations-which is typically a
legislative prerogative. The issue that § 27A raises, however, is not the general subject-
matter of the legislation, but rather the propriety of legislating over a proper subject-mat-
ter in a manner which only affects pending actions. The ill-fated legislation in Klein was no
less concerned with a typically legislative judgment-the liability of the government for
property seized in the course of the war.
131 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
132 See Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 405.




The section 27A cases reveal that attempts to apply the underly-
ing law exception result in one of two conclusions. On the one hand,
the ambiguities latent in the legal process model of adjudication allow
section 27A to be classified as a change in law. The rather inept draft-
ing of the statute aside, it is difficult to envision section 27A as any-
thing else. Indeed, in the wake of Robertson it is difficult to
characterize any legislation as something other than a change in law,
which is problematic from the standpoint of separation of powers ju-
risprudence. On the other hand, courts repelled by the restrictive
scope of section 27A's application are forced to characterize reason-
able separation of powers objections in a somewhat absurd way. In
order to make the plausible argument that there should be an excep-
tion to the Changed Law Rule where the scope of legislation goes no
further than pending litigation, they must also put forth the ridicu-
lous claim that such legislation is not a change in law.
D. Problems with Applying the Klein Rules
As discussed earlier, the comment concerning Klein in the second
edition of Hart & Wechsler's casebook on federal courts is the source
of the dictation of fact exception that is attributed to Klein.'34 This
section contends that the exception intuitively seems plausible based
on the legal process notions developed by Hart and Sacks in their
Harvard lectures. 135 Nevertheless, the dictation of fact exception suf-
fers from the indeterminacy embodied in any attempt to ground a
decision on the basis of categories as amorphous as "fact" and "law."
1 36
The rule seems plausible because lawyers often carve up the adju-
dicative universe into categories of determinations of law, findings of
fact, and applications of law to fact.137 As generally understood, our
adversarial system depends on a neutral set of rules being impartially
applied by the judge after the parties have proffered grounds for the
germane set of rules and evidence of the relevant facts for the case.
The intrusion of a third party, the legislature, into the dispute upsets
the balance. When the legislature promulgates new law, the role of a
judge is unimpeached, insofar as the judge is simply confronted with a
new neutral rule to apply. On the other hand, when the legislature
goes so far as to mandate how the judge is to determine a certain fact,
134 See supra note 71.
135 See HART & SAcKs, supra note 88.
136 For an excellent discussion of the legal process view advocated by Hart and Sacks,
see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Gary Peller, The New Public Law Movement: Moderation As a
Postmodern CulturalForm, 89 MICH. L. Rrv. 707 (1991).
137 See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
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the functions of fact finding and equal application of the laws are
frustrated.
The problem with this model is that facts and rules are not so
neatly disjoined. What counts as a relevant fact in a given case will
depend on what is determined to be the relevant rule, which in turn
depends on the characterization of the facts. It is unnecessary to take
a position regarding the indeterminacy of language' 38 or the theory-
ladenness of facts.1 39 Nor is it vital to maintain that the fact-law dis-
tinction is not useful for some purposes. Rather, the point is simply
that the distinction is not useful as an analytic concept for distinguish-
ing between types of legislative acts. 140 As the above discussion re-
garding the efforts of the courts indicates, the distinction is too elusive
for consistent application. 141
Robertson illustrates the problems inherent in applying the under-
lying law exception. There it was clear that the status of the legislation
depended entirely on the framework employed by the court to charac-
terize the legislation. To the Supreme Court, it was new law because it
created an independent ground for environmental adequacy. To the
Ninth Circuit, it was a dictation of fact because it interfered with how
the court would decide whether the preexisting rules applied to a par-
ticular fact. In other words, even though a law might seem patently
clear, it can still be described as establishing an independent rule,
rather than as a dictation of fact.142
138 See, e.g., WimLARD VAN ORMAN QUnE, ONTOLOGICAL RELATVTY AND OTHER ESSAYS
32 (1969).
139 See THOMAS S. KuHN, THE STRuirURE OF ScENTcrnc REVOLUTIONS 53-65 (1970);
Imre Lakatos, Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, in CRrncisM
AND THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE 91-197 (Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave eds., 1970). For
examples of attempts to apply these concepts of the philosophy of science and language to
legal analysis, see Stanley Fish, Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in the Law and in
Literary Criticism, in THE POLmcS OF INTERRTATION 271 (W.J.T. Mitchell ed., 1983); MARK
KELMAN, A GuME TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIEss 46 (1987); RPcHARD A. POSNER, THE
PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 42-61 (1990).
140 See Dean Alfange,Jr., The Supreme Court and the Separation of Powers: A Welcome Return
to Normalcy?, 58 CEO. WASH. L. REV. 668, 711 (1990). See also THE FEDERAiUST No. 37 at 244
(James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) ("[e]xperience has instructed us that no skill
in the science of government has yet been able to discriminate and define, with sufficient
certainty, its three great provinces-the legislative, executive, andjudiciary... [q]uestions
daily occur in the course of practice which prove the obscurity which reigns in these sub-
jects, and which puzzle the greatest adapts in political science.").
141 For an extended criticism of the distinction between fact and law in the context of
judicial oversight of administrative agency action, see C USTopHuR F. EDLEY, JR., ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY 98-105 (1990). See generally
Kenneth S. Abraham, Statutoy Interpretation and Literary Theory: Some Common Concerns of an
Unlikely Pair, 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 676 (1979).
142 Perhaps the best evidence of the evisceration of K/ein's result by these approaches is
provided by the Ninth Circuit's Gray v. First Winthrop Corp. decision. See quotation, supra
note 95. Furthermore, the confusion is not limited to the courts. The commentaries on
§ 27A published thus far have reached different conclusions regarding the proper stan-
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Attempts under the Klein rules to distinguish between law and
nonlaw have yielded two unacceptable results: courts either defer to
the legislative enactments at issue or allow their own political views to
dictate whether the substantive objective of the legislation merits judi-
cial deference. Neither of these alternatives is acceptable. Part II ar-
gues that the integrity and independence of the judiciary is impeded
when its judgments can be nullified by the stroke of the legislative
pen. Judicial integrity, however, is equally jeopardized when courts
defend their turf in an unprincipled and ad hoc manner.
II
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SEPARATION OF POWERS
DoCRINE AND PURELY RETROACTIVE LEGISLATION
In Part I, we saw that the rules attributed to Klein fail to provide a
basis for consistent and reasoned decision-making in cases involving
congressional legislation enacted to affect pending litigation. In advo-
cating the abandonment of these rules, however, it is not this Note's
purpose to suggest that no check should be placed on the legislature
in such situations. Justice Chase's concern that the legislature does
not have the power to prescribe a judicial rule of decision resonates
strongly. Intuitively, the legislature's ability to manipulate the results
of pending litigation undermines the ideal of ordered liberty and the
protections against tyranny for which divided government strives.143
This section validates that intuition by locating its foundation in the
principles underlying the separation of powers.
Our discussion of congressional efforts to affect pending cases
has disclosed two problematic elements of such legislation: (1) ma-
nipulation of the courts, and (2) retroactive alteration of the legal
status of the parties embroiled in the pending litigation. 44 Separa-
tion of powers analysis under the Klein rules rests solely on the first
feature, treating the second element as irrelevant1 45 Such an ap-
proach to separation of powers questions is purely "branch protec-
tive." 146 The antinomy created by the distinction between "law" and
"non-law" presupposes that there are distinct kinds of legislation and
that the task of separation of powers analysis is to determine the
proper category in which to place section 27A. By viewing the prob-
dard and result in the case. Fisch, supra note 4, at S121-22 (§ 27A did not change the
underlying law and thus, is unconstitutional). Goldstein, supra note 4, at 892-93 (conclud-
ing that although § 27A fails to change the underlying law it is nonetheless constitutional);
Palm, supra note 4, at 1294 (§ 27A changes the underlying law and thus is constitutional);
Sabino, supra note 2, at 52-54 (same).
143 See Hart, supra note 65, at 1373.
144 See supra notes 109 to 116 and accompanying text.
145 See supra notes 109 to 122 and accompanying text.
146 See Brown supra note 1, at 1518-19.
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lem as an intrusion into the court's decision-making process, the an-
tinomy obscures the possibility that retroactivity itself may pose
separation of powers concerns. We can bring retroactivity back into
focus by accepting that section 27A is a change in law and asking
whether separation of powers principles require a determination that
section 27A is an improper change in the law. 147
In Section II.A., this Note provides a model for examining these
issues. Section II.B. briefly traces the contours of separation of powers
principles. Finally, Section II.C. argues that purely retroactive legisla-
tion implicates constitutional concerns under the separation of pow-
ers doctrine that are distinct from due process concerns.
A. A Model for Understanding the Problem Posed by Klein
The Supreme Court has long held that retroactive changes in law
are to be applied to adjudicated cases pending appeal.148 As noted
earlier, this Note refers to this rule as the Changed Law Rule. 149 The
Changed Law Rule inevitably creates conflict between the legislative
and judicial branches, since, if applied without limitation, the
Changed Law Rule allows Congress to alter judgments prior to the
conclusion of the appeals process. Given that one of the purposes of
the separation of powers doctrine is to insulate the litigation of private
disputes from the vagaries of political power, there should seemingly
be some limit on Congress's ability to employ this power.
Imagine a spectrum representing the relative intrusiveness of leg-
islation employing the Changed Law Rule. At one end is legislation
(call it "Law X") that declares specifically and exclusively what the out-
come of a particular litigation should be (call it A v. B). Such a decla-
ration entails a high degree of intrusion on the power of the judiciary
to interpret and apply the law.' 50 At the other end of the spectrum is
legislation (call it "Law Y') that lengthens a statute of limitations for
an entire class of cases, so that if it is retroactively applied, it will de-
147 Thus far, however, this suggestion has been rejected by the circuit courts. Gray v.
First Winthrop Corp., 989 F.2d 1564, 1573 (9th Cir. 1993) (arguing that retroactive legisla-
tion need only pass the rational basis test under due process analysis); Henderson v. Scien-
tific-Atlanta, Inc., 971 F.2d 1567 (lth Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 95 (1993).
148 United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801). See BATOR Er AL.,
supra note 55, at 369 n.4; Young, supra note 30, at 1238-44.
149 This Note borrows the term from Professor Young. See Young, supra note 30, at
1240.
150 See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 468 (1944) ("[W]henever the judicial
power is called into play, it is responsible directly to the fundamental law and no other
authority can intervene to force or authorize the judicial body to disregard it.") (Rutledge,
J., dissenting). One might, however, implausibly argue that Law X is merely one more
piece of the legal mosaic which the courts are obliged to apply. Such a reading seems
implicit in the Court's analysis in Robertson. See 112 S. Ct. at 1413-14.
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prive the defendant of an affirmative defense (call it Cv. D). 151 Law Y
is less intrusive than Law X because (1) its purpose is not to affect
individual litigation, but rather an area of the law; (2) it changes law
prospectively as well as retrospectively (Law X only has retrospective
application since it only applies to the particular case); and (3) it does
not alter the substantive rights of the affected litigants in the same way
as Law X because D had notice of the possibility of legal liability,
whereas B did not.15 2
Section 27A fits somewhere between these two hypotheticals.
First, its purpose was not to affect only a single litigation, but rather a
class (although a narrow one) of pending litigation. Second, it did
not change law prospectively, only retrospectively. Third, although
the distinction between substance and procedure is obscure, statutes
of limitations are generally treated as less fundamental to the rights of
parties than, for example, a law creating a cause of action.
For our purposes, consideration of this spectrum will help to
identify the problems with permitting legislative preemption of pend-
ing cases. The following sections focus on the separation of powers
implications of such preemption.
B. The Legislature and the Courts
Fearing the concentration of political power, the Framers
adopted a tripartite division of power in the structural provisions of
the Constitution. As Madison noted, "where the whole power of one
department is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole
power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free
constitution are subverted."'53 The development of separation of
powers jurisprudence is derived from the Constitution's general grant
of legislative, executive and judicial powers to each of the three
branches in Articles I, II, and III, and the political principles embod-
ied therein.
151 See Bradley v. School Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 715-16 (1974) (concluding that legislation
will generally be applied retroactively unless Congress directs otherwise or doing so results
in manifest injustice). But see Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988)
(stating that silent legislation is presumed to have only prospective effect). For a discus-
sion of retroactive application of general legislation, see Michele A. Estrin, Note, Retroactive
Application of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to Pending Cases, 90 MIcH. L. REv. 2035 (1992);
Charles B. Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73
HARv. L. REv. 692 (1960); Bryant Smith, Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights I, 6 TEx. L. REv.
409 (1928).
152 Obviously, if LawY had shortened the limitation period, thereby retroactively deny-
ing C a cause of action, then C cannot be said to have been given notice in the same
manner.




When allocating judicial power to the federal courts, the Framers
dearly acknowledged the danger posed by legislative attempts to
usurp the prerogatives of the courts. 154 In The Federalist No. 47,
Madison explained that "[t] he entire legislature can perform nojudici-
ary act" and that "[w] ere the power ofjudging joined with the legisla-
tive, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary
control, for the judge would then be the legislator."' 5 5 Examples of
such transgressions by state legislatures were familiar to the Fram-
ers.156 In The Federalist No. 48, Madison noted instances of overreach-
ing by the Virginia and Pennsylvania legislatures. 157
A test of the separation principles came early in the history of the
new Republic. In 1791, Congress enacted legislation creating a system
by which Revolutionary War veterans could apply to the federal circuit
courts for a veteran's pension. The courts' task was to determine
whether the applicant was indeed a veteran and to enter judgments
for the amount of pension to be awarded. The legislation, however,
contained a provision giving the Secretary of War the power to deny
the judgment of the courts. In what came to be known as Hayburn's
Case, the circuits refused to hear the veterans' petitions on the ground
that the legislation vested judicial power in the hands of the executive
branch. 158 In short, Hayburn's Case demonstrates that reserving the
power to alter judicial judgments by the legislative branch eviscerates
the judicial power.
Klein is a more complex instance of legislative intrusion. Unlike
the final judgments that would have been subject to review in
Hayburn, Klein's case was pending appeal at the time of the legislative
action. Because the legislature has the power to enact general legisla-
tion, Klein seemingly presents a case where the exercise of that power
improperly interjects itself into the exercise of judicial power. A
broad reading of the Changed Law Rule, however, allows such a legis-
lative trump on the ground that the judicial function has not really
been infringed upon. Under this interpretation, the execution of the
judicial power involves the application of law to litigants, and legisla-
tive action in this instance merely gives the judiciary a different set of
laws to apply. But this seems to allow legislation as long as it affects
more than one case!
The issue ultimately raised by Klein and by the section 27A cases is
whether the fact that the legislature has exercised its general legisla-
154 This summary of the Federalist Papers and Hayburn's Case borrows heavily from
the excellent discussion in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 1 F.3d 1487, 1490-93 (6th Cir.
1993).
155 THE FDERAisT No. 47, at 304-05 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
156 GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 154-55 (1969).
157 THE FEDERAuST No. 48, at 308 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
158 Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 408 (1792).
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ive powers in a purely retroactive manner alters the logic of Changed
Law Rule. The next subpart argues that it does.
C. Separation of Powers Principles in the Context of Retroactive
Legislation
In determining the shape of a new government, the Framers of
the Constitution expressed concern regarding the power of govern-
ment to alter the legal consequences of past conduct by retroactive
legislation in the Bill of Attainder, Ex Post Facto, Contract, and, later,
the Due Process Clauses.15 9 Since the Supreme Court held early on in
the history of the new Republic that the Ex Post Facto Clause applied
only to criminal laws,160 and the Bill of Attainder 161 and Contract
Clauses162 have also been narrowly construed, the constitutional analy-
sis of retroactive civil legislation has fallen to due process jurispru-
dence. 163 Under due process analysis, courts and commentators have
159 See Byrant Smith, Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights, 5 TEx. L. REv. 231, 231 (1927).
This concern did not extend to retroactive changes in adjudicative law. See Smith, supra
note 151, at 414-15. The reason may stem from the Blackstonian view that courts do not
make law. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HAnv. L. REv. 1731, 1758-64 (1991).
160 Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 138 (1810); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.)
386, 390 (1798). This interpretation of the Ex Post Facto Clause was not without its critics.
As Justice Story explained,
The terms, ex post facto laws, in a comprehensive sense, embrace all retro-
spective laws, or laws governing or controlling past transactions, whether
they are of a civil, or a criminal nature. And there have not been wanting
learned minds, that have contended with no small force of authority and
reasoning, that such ought to be the interpretation of the terms in the con-
stitution of the United States. As an original question, the argument would
be entitled to grave consideration; but the current opinion and authority
has been so generally one way.., that it is difficult to feel, that it is now an
open question. The general interpretation has been, and is, that the
phrase applies to acts of a criminal nature only.
3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITLTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1339
(1970). For a summary of the groundsjustifying the competing interpretations, see Elmer
E. Smead, The Rule Against Retroactive Legislation: A Basic Principle ofjurisprudence, 20 MINN.
L. Rv. 775, 791-92 n.51 (1936).
161 See Sabino, supra note 2, at 56-59.
162 For a recent discussion of the Contract Clause, see Robert A. Graham, Note, The
Constitution, the Legislature, and Unfair Surprise: Toward a Reliance-Based Approach to the Con-
tract Claus 92 MIcH. L. REv. 398 (1993).
163 The emphasis on the Due Process Clause, however, was not an instantaneous devel-
opment. The restrictive interpretation of the Ex Post Facto clause led the Marshall court
to develop two lines of analysis for limiting the power of state legislatures to enact retroac-
tive state legislation. First, the Court took an expansive view of the meaning of "contract."
Fletcherv. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 136-37 (1810). Second, the Court utilized a notion
of "vested rights" grounded in natural law as a limitation on the power of state legislatures.
Id. at 143 ("I do not hesitate to declare that a state does not possess the power of revoking
its own grants. But I do it on a general principle, on the reason and nature of things: a
principle which will impose laws even on the deity.") (Johnson, J., concurring); Terrett v.
Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43, 50-51 (1815). Although the early Court appears to have
been in agreement that retroactive legislation violates the natural law, it was not unequivo-
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focused on the fairness of the retroactive legislation.16 4 The threshold
question ignored by this approach to retroactivity is whether the legis-
lature has the power to enact such laws.165 Thus, in articulating a new
framework for understanding conflicts between the courts and Con-
gress, this Section explores a forgotten dimension of the jurispru-
dence of retroactivity-whether the separation of powers doctrine
should be seen as a constraint on the power of Congress to enact ret-
roactive legislation.' 66
cal about its power to annul state legislation on this ground. Id. Compare Terrett with Calder
v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388-89 (1798) (refusing to void retroactive state legislation
even though "[t]o maintain that our Federal, or State, Legislature possesses such powers, if
they had not been expressly restrained; would, in my opinion, be a political heresy, alto-
gether inadmissible in our free republican governments") (emphasis omitted); Watson v.
Mercer, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 88, 110 (1834). See generally Smead, supra note 160, at 788-91;
Smith, supra note 159, at 234-35.
164 See Guido Calabresi, Retroactivity: Paramount Powers and Contractual Changes, 71 YALE
LJ. 1191, 1191 n.2 (1962) ("Thus, for example both Hochman and Slawson are concerned
with demonstrating, through examinations of the factors which courts appear to weigh in
these cases, that 'fairness' is the ultimate test of the validity of retroactive laws. Both au-
thors bypass questions of the sources of legislative power to enact such laws, simply assum-
ing the power exists subject to due process limitations.") (citations omitted). See also
Estrin, supra note 151, at 2049 (arguing that apprehension regarding retrospective laws
rests on equitable, not constitutional, concerns); Hochman supra note 151, at 696 (arguing
that "vested rights" is a conclusory term, and thus, modem due process analysis turns on
the question of the degree and reasonableness of a party's reliance on prior law).
165 Legislative power was at the heart of the concern shared by natural law theorists.
See, e.g., Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) ("It is against all reason and justice,
for a people to entrust a Legislature with such [retroactive] powers; and, therefore, it can-
not be presumed that they have done it."). Thus, the concept "vested rights" took a very
different form in the natural law decisions than it does in contemporary due process analy-
sis. Under natural law, one found that a right had vested by inquiring whether the right
had been "perfected" under the laws existing prior to the enactment of the retroactive
legislation. The defect in retroactive legislation was not that it unfairly upset the settled
expectations of the parties, but, rather, that retroactive legislation which disturbed the
perfected right was not legislative in nature. See, e.g., Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 388 ("An
ACT of the Legislature (for I cannot call it a law) contrary to the great first principles of
the social compact, cannot be considered a rightful exercise of the legislative authority.").
See generally Smead, supra note 160, at 780 ("Retroactive laws were held to be oppressive
and unjust, and it was maintained that the essence of a law was that it be a rule for the
future.") (emphasis added). Under due process analysis, on the other hand, the status of
retroactive legislative acts as law is not questioned. Whether the law meets the require-
ments of fairness implicated in the due process clause is really what is at issue. The con-
cept of vested rights merely becomes a threshold question to determine whether or not the
Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments are implicated by the legislative action.
166 A word of caution for the reader: there are no Supreme Court cases that directly
support finding such a constraint in the separation of powers. There are, I believe, histori-
cal reasons for the Court's not having taken a route. Most of the early Supreme Court
decisions concerning retroactivity involved challenges to state legislative action. The sepa-
ration of powers doctrine was of no avail in such cases. In Calder, the opinion of the Court
suggests that a separation of powers argument was made on the basis of the state constitu-
tion. While expressing sympathy for the claimant, the Court held that such a state law
matter was outside itsjurisdiction. As no constitutional constraint could be found to limit
the state legislatures, the Court developed a limitation based on the natural law. See supra
note 163. With the development of this doctrine, the Court had no occasion to develop a
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Before proceeding further we need to distinguish between three
kinds of legislation: (1) legislation with only prospective effects; (2)
legislation with both prospective and retroactive effects; and (3) legis-
lation with purely retroactive effects.' 67 The third type of legislation
contains a subset, "pending case law": laws which limit the retroactive
application to cases pending in the courts at the time of enactment. 168
In Gray v. First Winthrop Corp., the Ninth Circuit summarily dis-
missed the claim that a purely retroactive law raises separation of pow-
ers concerns.' 69 According to the Gray court, precedent supports the
conclusion that Congress has the power to enact legislation with retro-
active effect and that the rationality of such legislation is unaffected by
the nonexistence of any putative prospective effect.170 This analysis
conflates the very different inquiries necessary for questions of process
separation of powers doctrine to meet the question of federal retroactive legislation. But
see the discussion of United States v. Klein, infra notes 224-46 and accompanying text. The
natural law theory eventually came into disrepute; but, on the heels of the decline of natu-
ral law theory came the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment. The vested rights doctrine
developed by the natural law theorists was simply transplanted to due process analysis.
While exceptions emerged, the development of a strong interest in protecting proprietary
rights during the Lochner era diverted litigants from invoking other constitutional provi-
sions to restrain retroactive legislation. See Smith, supra note 159, at 234, 237. It is pecu-
liar, however, that the assertion that retroactive legislation was beyond the legislative power
was not seen as raising a constitutional separation of powers problem. See Smith, supra
note 159, at 235.
167 See Stephen R. Munzer, Retroactive Law, 6J. LEGAL STUD. 373, 381 (1977):
[A] law is retroactive with respect to an act if and only if the law was created
at a given time, the act was done before that time, and the law altered the
legal status of that act. On the basis of this characterization, we may also say
that a law is purely retroactive, or purely prospective, retrospectively, if
every act to which it is applicable antedates, or postdates, its creation. A law
is partly retroactive and partly prospective if it is applicable to at least one
act occurring before, and one occurring after, its creation.
168 The definition of retroactivity employed in this Note is broader than the one pro-
vided by Munzer. Id. Munzer's definition is restricted to legislation which alters the legal
status of a past act. For example, the legislature enacts a law at time t 2 making possession
of alcohol illegal, and Smith was in such possession at time tj. Another sense of retroactiv-
ity, which persists today, was articulated by Justice Story in Society for the Propagation of the
Gospel in Foreign Parts v. Wheller, 2 Gall CC 105 (1814). As Smead states: "The identification
of the principle [against retroactivity] with vested rights was made by expanding the princi-
ple to make it include a prohibition against laws which commenced on the date of enact-
ment and which operated in futuro, but which, in doing so, divested rights, particularly
property rights, which had been vested anterior to the time of enactment of the laws."
Smead, supra note 160, at 781-82.
I adopt Story's twofold conception of retroactivity, sans the vested rights language.
Thus, I include in this category of "pending case law" those laws which are purely retro-
spective in effect, but prospective in form. For example, the legislation in Seattle Audubon is
purely prospective insofar as it does not alter the legal status of prior agency action.
Rather, the legislation permits future agency action which may moot the injunctive relief
sought. See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text. Thus, Seattle Audubon is a retrospec-
tive law in the second sense articulated by Story.
169 989 F.2d 1564, 1570 (9th Cir. 1993). See also Henderson v. Scientific-Atlanta Inc.,
971 F.2d 1567, 1573 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 95 (1993).
170 The Gray court wrote:
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and questions of power.171 Under due process analysis, courts ex-
amine retroactive legislation in light of its effect on the parties and the
rationality of the legislature in adversely affecting the parties' settled
expectations. 17 2 A separation of powers approach to retroactive legis-
lation would focus not on the issue of whether a right had vested, but
rather on whether giving retroactive effect to legislation undermines
the goals of the separation of powers doctrine.173
There are at least three separation of powers values implicated
when general legislation is applied retroactively. First, the "ordered
liberty argument" concentrates on the fear that an unfettered majority
might trample minority rights protected in the Constitution. 174 This
assumes that the federal courts, as a counter-majoritarian institution,
Appellees argue in the alternative that Section 27A's purely retroactive ap-
plication renders the legislation constitutionally infirm as violating the prin-
ciple of separation of powers. They assert that to effect the requisite
"change in the underlying law" for Klein purposes, Congress had to couple
section 27A's retroactive provision with a prospective change in the law.
Cases do not support this argument. Congress clearly has the power to
amend a statute and to make that change applicable to pending cases. Fur-
ther, the Supreme Court has consistently held that Congress may enact leg-
islation with retroactive effect so long as it comports with Due Process by
passing constitutional muster under rational basis scrutiny. In Pension
Benefit [Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717 (1984)], the Court
explained that while "retroactive legislation does have to meet a burden not
faced by legislation that has only future effects," that burden is met "simply
by showing that the retroactive application of the legislation is itself justi-
fied by a rational legislative purpose.
989 F.2d 1564, 1570 (9th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted).
171 See e.g., Calabresi, supra note 164, at 1191; Hochman, supra note 151, at 694. Due
process, however, was not always the basis for the constitutional analysis of retroactive legis-
lation. See supra note 163 (discussing the natural law objections to retroactivity).
172 With regard to retroactivity, due process jurisprudence focuses on two issues. First,
in order for retrospective application of a law to implicate due process concerns, the new
law must abrogate a vested right. See Hochman, supra note 151, at 696 (noting that "vested
right" is conclusory and that the proper analysis of retroactive laws under the due process
clause involves a determination of the degree of reliance by the parties). As noted earlier,
the lower federal courts have unanimously held that § 27A does not abrogate a vested
right. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. Second, where a vested right is abrogated,
the court applies a rational basis test. See U.S. v. Sperry, 493 U.S. 52, 53 (1989); Pension
Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R. A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 718 (1984); Usery v. Turner Elkhorn
Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976). In reality, the notion of vested rights is mostly paid lip
service by the courts and the focus of the inquiry is really a rational basis test. See Pacific
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. First Republicbank Corp., 997 F.2d 39, 47 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. granted,
114 S. Ct. 680 (1994); James L Kainen, The Historical Framework for Reviving Constitutional
Protection for Property and Contract Rights, 79 CoRNELL L. REv. 87, 111-23 (1993).
173 But see Estrin, supra note 151, at 2049 n.99 (asserting that separation of powers
concerns do not underlie the Court's presumption against retroactivity); Verkuil, supra
note 1, at 306 (suggesting that due process can do the work of the separation of powers
doctrine).
174 See Brown, supra note 1, at 1538; Alan B. Morrison, A Non Power Looks at Separation of
Powers, 79 GEO. L.J. 281 (1990).
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protect such rights more effectively than the other two branches of
government.175
Second, the "institutional integrity argument" focuses on the op-
timal operation of the tripartite scheme of American constitutional-
ism. The judiciary cannot be a coequal branch of government, as
intended by the Framers, without the power of judicial review. Nor
can the judiciary be an effective branch of government if the legiti-
macy of its decisionmaking process is rendered doubtful by acts of
Congress. 76 To combat frequent reversal, the Court's process be-
comes clouded by calculations about the prospect of being overruled.
The courts' authority is, thus, eroded both by Congress' direct assault
on its decisions and by indirect politicization underlying courts' deci-
sions. This, of course, exists to a limited degree where Congress pro-
spectively amends legislation to correct what it perceives as judicial
misinterpretation of its statutes, but the threat to the status of the judi-
ciary increases where legislative review retroactively defeats the judg-
ments of the courts. Moreover, legislative interference with the
judiciary undermines the "equality principle" that lies at the heart of
the judicial process. 177 The legitimacy of the judiciary -depends, in
large part, upon the treatment of like cases in a like manner. 78
Third, the "accountability argument" focuses on the structural
implications of separated powers for the democratic process.' 79 The
division of power among the branches creates a framework of action
within each branch that serves to limit the possible avenues of subter-
fuge available to competing branches. For example, a legislature with
judicial power will be less accountable to the general public because it
can enact general legislation to achieve one set of ends, while control-
ling the outcomes of cases arising under such legislation to achieve a
different set of ends.180
175 See Brown, supra note 1, at 1566.
176 This concern arises even in the context of purely prospective, reactive legislation.
SeeAbnerJ. Mikva &JeffBleich, When Congress Overru/es the Court, 79 CAL. L. REV. 729, 746-
49 (1991) (discussing impact of congressional overruling on the legitimacy of the court).
177 See Ronald A. Dworkin, "Natural" Law Rvsited, 34 U. FL. L. Rxv. 165, 185 (1982).
Dworkin makes this point in the context ofjudicial overruling. While the principle, qua
principle, is not called into doubt by legislation, the perception of an arbitrary judiciary
may nonetheless be raised in the minds of those who may not appreciate the finer distinc-
tions between common and statutory law.
178 But see LON L. FuLLER, TiH MORAL=rr OF LAW 211 (rev. ed. 1969) (noting that in
some cases like as like is served by retroactive legislation).
179 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 966 (1983) ("The only effective constraint on
Congress' power is political, but Congress is most accountable politically when it prescribes
rules of general applicability. When it decides rights of specific persons, those rights are
subject to 'the tyranny of the shifting majority.'") (Powell, J., concurring).
180 The accountability argument differs from the ordered liberty argument insofar as
the latter is concerned with protecting the minority from the majority, whereas the former
is concerned with protecting the majority's capacity to evaluate governmental action. See
1994]
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Within the context of due process jurisprudence, as the Ninth
Circuit in Gray correctly perceived, the distinction between partly ret-
rospective laws and purely retrospective laws is irrelevant. 81 The ques-
tion of whether a right has vested is backward-looking. Rights vest
when they have been perfected in the past. A party does not rely dif-
ferently on old law merely because application of the new law is lim-
ited to pre-enactment conduct. 8 2
Under separation of powers analysis, however, the distinction be-
tween partial and pure retroactivity is crucial. As a general matter,
permitting otherwise prospective laws to have retroactive effect is con-
sistent with the ordered liberty and institutional integrity. Such laws
satisfy ordered liberty concerns because the prospective effect of the
law encompasses the general populace, thereby acting as a check on
majoritarian impulses.'83 All other things being equal, the majority is
encompassed by the new law. Such laws also satisfy institutional integ-
rity by preserving the principle of equality, at least in part, since the
new law treats future and pending cases identically. 8 4 These values
are plainly not satisfied in the case of purely retrospective legislation.
A (often very small) minority, comprised of past actors, are the only
generally Martin H. Redish & ElizabethJ. Cisar, "If Angels Were to Govern": The Need for Prag-
matic Formalism in Separation of Powers Theoy, 41 DuKE L.J. 449, 451-52 (1991).
181 Pacific Mut. Ins. Co. v. First Republicbank Corp., 997 F.2d 39, 53 (5th Cir. 1993)
(noting that Usery did not "predicate its blessing of retroactive legislation on an associated
prospective component."), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 680 (1994). See also Henderson v. Scien-
tific-Atlanta, Inc., 971 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 95 (1993).
182 See, e.g., Henderson v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 971 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1992) (com-
mencement of law suit did not vest right to application of limitory period pre-dating
§ 27A), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct 95 (1993); Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254
(2d Cir. 1948) (same holding with respect to Portal-to-Portal Act), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 887
(1948).
183 One might respond that counter-majoritarian concerns are adequately protected
by substantive due process in those cases involving fundamental rights because strict scru-
tiny is triggered. I think this response fails for three reasons. First, the Framer's counter-
majoritarian concerns were not limited to the contemporary court's list of fundamental
rights. One of their goals in structuring the new national government was to limit the
ability of an unpropertied majority to undermine minority property rights. Second, purely
retrospective legislation may threaten minority property rights that are not adequately safe-
guarded by the political system. Suppose, for example, a purely retrospective law is en-
acted to limit liability to tort victims injured in an industrial accident. The Court might
find such legislation rational for a number of reasons; for example, avoiding the bank-
ruptcy of a company vital to the American economy. Third, separation of powers doctrine
may provide greater protection for those fundamental interests than would substantive due
process analysis because the determination does not hinge upon whether purely retrospec-
tive abrogation of rights is justified, but whether the legislation is beyond the scope of
congressional power.
184 This is not to say that a prospective law could never be invalidated on separation of
powers grounds. For example, the prospective effect of the legislation may be illusory
because there are no possible future parties to whom the new law will apply. Under the
meaning of retroactive legislation previously outlined, see supra note 168, legislation that is
prospective only in form is purely retroactive.
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ones affected by the new law; thus they cannot look to the majority for
support in the political arena. Moreover, those actors are the only ac-
tors subject to the new law. Their cases are treated differently from
those in the past and those in the future.18 5 These defects are all the
more magnified in the case of pending case laws, because the number
of individuals will be small and their identity will be known at the time
of the legislation.
To put it differently, where Congress seeks to alter the effect of
prior conduct through retroactive legislation, a requirement that the
legislation also operate prospectively acts as a ratchet restraining
against majoritarian exploitation. To get the retroactive effect of the
legislation on known parties, the legislature must live with the prospec-
tive effect on unknown parties, who could be anyone. Without such
prospective effect, the legislature is unbounded by concern for future
litigants-the ratchet is removed. And, again, this is all the more true
where the known parties effected by retroactive legislation is limited to
named litigants in pending actions.
An exception to the Changed Law Rule for pending case laws is,
moreover, consistent with a broad view of Congress' power to remove
jurisdiction from the federal courts for classes of cases. Accepting, for
the sake of argument, the view that Article III, section 2 of the U.S.
Constitution provides Congress with the power to withdraw a particu-
lar subject matter completely from federal court jurisdiction, 8 6 we
saw that Klein limits Congress' jurisdictional power: Congress may
completely withdraw jurisdiction of the federal courts over a subject-
matter, but it cannot provide for partial withdrawal contingent upon
the judgment of the court.
The rationale for drawing this distinction is compelling. The
power of absolute withdrawal of federal jurisdiction provides Congress
with an important check on the power of the judiciary. Congress' use
of this check, however, carries with it certain appropriate costs.1 8 7 By
withdrawing federal jurisdiction over a subject matter, Congress loses
the benefits of having a federal forum for decision of such cases and
185 In the case of § 27A, the parties are treated similarly to prior parties. The Note
argues, infra notes 267-71 and accompanying text, that this is an important factor in find-
ing § 27A constitutional. But, we can well imagine that Congress could have altered the
statute of limitations for pending cases so that it would have differed from prior law, as well
as future law under Lampf
186 Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 1001, 1005-06
(1965); Gunther, supra note 93, at 905-06. But see Hart, supra note 65, at 1365 ("exceptions
must not be such as will destroy the essential role of the Supreme Court in the constitu-
tional plan"); Joseph Ratner, Congressional Power Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, 109 U. PA. L. Ray. 157 (1960); Sager, supra note 49, at 42-60. See generally BATOR Er
Al., supra note 55, at 380-82.




must take its chances with state courts. In constitutional and federal
statutory matters, Congress also loses the benefits that stem from a
uniform system of law. Moreover, in the case of federal statutory mat-
ter, Congress loses the benefit of having its law interpreted by federal
courts as opposed to parochial state courts.
Thus, absolute withdrawal of jurisdiction serves as a potent
weapon over a recalcitrant federal judiciary, but a weapon which has
internal checks that curb the frequency of its use. In contrast, as Klein
held, permitting partial withdrawals of jurisdiction is illegitimate; it
affords Congress the check on judicial power without the costs associ-
ated with the loss of the federal forum. To grant institutional legiti-
macy to purely retrospective legislation provides Congress with the
same windfall. It allows Congress to provide a federal forum for litiga-
tion while, at the same time, holding in reserve the trump card of
legislative alteration of the pending case.188 In this respect, the sepa-
ration of powers value of political accountability is undermined, since
Congress can reap the political benefits of popular legislation while
remaining cynically aware that it may alter the consequences of that
legislation to satisfy special interests with narrowly targeted pending
case laws. 189
This view of the separation of powers entails looking beyond the
mere form of legislative and judicial acts.' 90 It eschews the formalism
188 See infra note 240 (quoting Young).
189 This is not to suggest that such manipulation would be a frequent occurrence if
Congress felt free to do it. Given intra-branch political checks, it is likely only to occur in
extraordinary circumstances. Nonetheless, such occasions are precisely when the judiciary
is needed.
Note also that this notion of accountability might be extended to support a conclusion
that the result in Beam is constitutionally based. Selective prospectivity insulates the court
from political accountability because it defers the consequences of the new rule. See Rich-
ard H. Fallon, Jr. & DanielJ. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity and Constitutional Remedies,
104 HARv. L. REv. 1731, 1802 to 1803 (1991) (arguing that "to deny full retroactivity to
[judicial] decisions makes it too easy to cut free from precedent and change the law in
much the way that the legislature would").
190 This does not imply, of course, that a more formalist argument could not be formu-
lated to support a prohibition of pure retrospectivity. Justice Story's conception of the
natural limits of the legislative power is consistent with such an attack. See supra notes 167-
68. Moreover, recent scholarship regarding the notion of a rule of law hints at similar
limitations. SeeAkhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Artile IH. Separating the Two Tiers of
Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. Ray. 205, 251 (1985) (suggesting, in a different context, that
"separation of powers was designed to ensure that the laws passed by the legislature would
be prospective and general. Their interpretation by an imported and independent judici-
ary would prevent retroactive modification and ensure even-handed application, thereby
promoting the rule of law."). Support for this position can be drawn from Hamilton's
comment in the Federalist 81:
A legislature, without exceeding its province, cannot reverse a discrimina-
tion once made, in a particular case; though it may prescribe a new rule for
future cases. This is the principle, and it applies, in all its consequences,
exactly in the same manner and extent, to the state governments, as to the
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of attempts to resolve conflicts between the branches on the basis of
categorical notions of "legislating" and "judging."191 As we discussed
earlier, such formalism blinkered the court in Gray, allowing it to re-
ject unhesitatingly the importance of section 27A's purely retroactive
feature. 192 A more substance-based view is both theoretically prefera-
ble and more consistent with the Supreme Court's recent approach to
separation of powers jurisprudence. 193 In viewing purely retroactive
legislation in light of the substantive ends of separation of powers doc-
trine, we have seen that such legislation intrudes on the prerogatives
that the creation of an independent judiciary was meant to protect.
Purely retroactive legislation allows Congress to target a small class of
persons forjudicial favor, achieving the same effect as if it had altered
the outcome by directly reviewing federal courts' judgments.
Although general legislation with retroactive effect impinges on sepa-
ration of powers values, the prospective aspect of that legislation ame-
liorates the danger. Purely retrospective legislation lacks this saving
grace.
III
REEXAMINING THE MEANING OF SCHO0.,VER PEGGY
WEELING BRIDGE AND A2EW
The purpose of this Part is to assess whether Klein is properly read
as standing for either of the rules attributed to it by modem courts.
Our reexamination of Klein will address two questions: does a fair
reading of Klein support the rules attributed to it by modem courts;
and, if not, what guidance does Klein offer for developing an alterna-
tive approach to retroactive legislation?
In order to appreciate the implications of Klein, it is necessary to
examine two earlier cases which served as the framework for the Klein
opinion. The first of these, Schooner Peggy,194 announced the Changed
Law Rule. The second, Wheeling Bridge,195 cited by Klein, found legisla-
tion which solely acted to reverse a federal court injunction to be
valid. Any reading of Klein as articulating an exception to the
Changed Law Rule can only be maintained against this background.
national government now under consideration. Not the least difference
can be pointed out in any view of the subject.
THE FEDERALIST, supra note 84, at 453. See generally G~azv WIuS, EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE
FEDERALIST 117-50 (1981) (explaining the legitimacyjustification underlying the Framers'
understanding of the separation of powers doctrine).
191 An analogous contention is made by EDLr, supra note 141, at 105, with regard to
division of power between the courts and administrative agencies.
192 See supra note 169-71 and accompanying text.
193 See infra notes 247-48 and accompanying text (discussing functionalist approaches
to separation of powers).
194 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801).
195 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1855).
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In this Part, the Note argues that, at the time that Klein was de-
cided, Schooner Peggy and Wheeling Bridge did not support an expansive
view of the Changed Law Rule. On this reading of its predecessors,
Klein need not stand for the proposition that retroactive characteris-
tics of legislation are irrelevant to the separation of powers doc-
trine. 196 Indeed, this Part concludes by arguing that Klein suggests
that retroactivity in fact played a part in the Court's separation of pow-
ers analysis.
A. Schooner Peggy, the Changed Law Rule, and the Public Rights-
Private Rights Distinction
In Schooner Peggy, ChiefJustice Marshall addressed the question of
whether an appellate court must restrict its examination to the ques-
tion of whether a case had been rightly decided by the lower court at
the time of that decision, or whether the appellate court should de-
cide the matter anew taking into account relevant legislation enacted
subsequent to the lower court's decision. The answer of the Chief
Justice would have important implications for the distribution of
power between the judiciary and the Congress.
The facts of the case were straightforward. Under the authority
of the President, the Schooner Peggy and her cargo had been cap-
tured and seized by the ship Trumball. 97 The Schooner Peggy had
been carrying goods from Port au Prince to France and, according to
the circuit court, had aboard it some light arms for self-defense. 198 In
a suit brought by the owner for the return of the Schooner Peggy, the
district court ruled in favor of the owner on the grounds that the ship
was not an "armed vessel" and that it was not taken on the "high seas"
within the meaning of the then-existing law.' 99 On September 23,
1800, the circuit court reversed on both grounds.200 Chief Justice
Marshall avoided these issues of interpretation by resting his determi-
nation on a treaty with France, ratified on December 21, 1801 after
the circuit court decision,201 which provided for the restoration of
captured property that had not yet been "definitively condemned."20 2
Marshall's argument for applying the new law created by the
treaty to the case is not entirely satisfying. Initially, he argued that,
under the Constitution, a treaty is the supreme law of the land. Thus,
for the Court to condemn the ship would constitute an action of the
196 For an example of this method of interpreting K/e/n, see BATOR Er AL., supra note
55, at 369 n.4.
197 Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 103.
198 Id. at 103-06.
199 Id. at 104-05.
200 Id. at 106-07.
201 Id. at 107-09.
202 Id. at 108.
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Court contrary to that law.20 3 In other words, because condemnation
is ajudicial act and, as was already decided, the lower courtjudgment
was not final with respect to the condemnation, the Court would be in
violation of the supreme law if it declared the ship condemned. The
argument, however, is circular. The requirement imposed on the
Court by the treaty is only binding if the Court, under the powers of
appellate review provided in Article III, applies the new law on appeal.
Marshall's second argument is entirely conclusory. He writes:
But if subsequent to the judgment and before the decision of the
appellate court, a law intervenes and positively changes the rule
which governs, the law must be obeyed, or its obligation denied. If
the law be constitutional, and of that no doubt in the present case
has been expressed, I know of no court which can contest its
obligation."204
Marshall is silent as to why no court would contest its obligation.
Finally, Marshall offers a pragmatic justification:
It is true that in mere private cases between individuals, a court will
and ought to struggle hard against a construction which will, by a
retrospective operation, affect the rights of parties, but in great na-
tional concerns where individual rights, acquired by war, are sacri-
ficed for national purposes, the contract, making the sacrifice,
ought always to receive a construction conforming to its manifest
import; and if the nation has given up the vested rights of its citi-
zens, it is not for the court, but for the government, to consider
whether it be a case proper for compensation. In such a case the
court must decide according to existing laws, and if it be necessary
to set aside a judgment, rightful when rendered, but which cannot
be affirmed but in violation of law, the judgment must be set
aside.20 5
That is to say, the importance of the national purpose in surrendering
the property under the treaty justified or outweighed any waiver of
vested rights that may result from the retroactive application of the
new law.
Marshall never explicitly raises the question of whether the sepa-
ration of powers doctrine limits such retroactive legislation. Indeed
the parties did not raise the issue. Instead, they merely argued that
the Schooner Peggy had been "definitively condemned," according to
the meaning of the treaty, by the decision of the lower court and of-
fered in support of that interpretive claim the proposition that an ap-
pellate court is limited to reviewing the lower court's determination
under the then-existing law. The question before the Court, then, was
203 Id.




merely one of treaty construction. Having found that the treaty was
manifestly intended to apply retroactively, Marshall declined to con-
strue "definitively condemned" to exclude pending cases.20 6 Thus,
while Marshall framed the issue in a manner which implicated the
function and powers of branches of government, his reasoning did
not explore separation of powers principles.20 7
Marshall's opinion warrants two final observations. First, Mar-
shall distinguished between private and public cases. 208 That there
may be a higher threshold for retroactive application of statutes in
cases involving private rights than in cases involving the government is
something to explore later.20 9 Second, Marshall appeared indifferent
to the question of whether or not the private rights of the parties had
vested. This distinguishes Schooner Peggy from modem cases challeng-
ing retroactive application of statutes on due process grounds. 210
B. Wheeling Bridge and the Distinction Between Regulatory and
Proprietary Governmental Activity
In Pennsylvania v. Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Co., the Court con-
sidered a legislative declaration that sought to invalidate an earlier
judgment of the Court.21' In May 1852, Pennsylvania had sought an
206 The summary of the case confirms this conclusion:
The controversy turned principally upon two points:
lst. Whether the capture could be considered as made on the high
seas, according to the import of that term as used in the act of congress of
July 9th, 1798, vol. 4. p. 163.
2nd. Whether, by the sentence of condemnation by the circuit court
on the 23d of September, 1800, the Schooner Peggy could be considered as
definitively condemned, within the meaning of the 4th article of the conven-
tion with France, signed at Paris on the 30th of September, 1800.
Id, at 108.
207 The Supreme Court had followed the Schooner Peggy's Changed Law Rule prior to
Klein. See United States v. Preston, 28 U.S. (3 Peters) 57, 66-67 (1830); Fairfax's Devisee v.
Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603, 632 (1813).
208 Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 108. Under the congressional act, the booty
would have been shared equally by the government and the officers and crew of the
Trumball. The case, then, is a mixed sort-involving both public and private rights.
209 The relevance of this distinction for separation of powers purposes has been devel-
oped in a line of cases concerning the propriety of Congress's creation of non-Article III
adjudicative bodies. The parameters of this distinction have shifted over time. See Mur-
ray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855); Crowell
v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932); Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,
458 U.S. 50 (1982); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prod. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985); Com-
modity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986); Granfinanciera, S.A. v.
Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989). For an excellent discussion of the Court's development of
this distinction, see Gordon G. Young, Public Rights and the FederalJudicial Power. From Mur-
ray's Lessee Through Crowell to Schor, 35 Bunr. L. Rxv. 765 (1986).
210 See supra note 171 and accompanying text. See also Hochman, supra note 151, at
694-95.
211 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1855).
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injunction from the Court, sitting in original jurisdiction, 212 to enjoin
the construction of two suspension bridges crossing the Ohio River at
Wheeling, West Virginia and Bridgeport, Ohio. The evidence showed
that at high water there was a type of steamship, important to com-
merce on the Ohio River, whose chimney stacks were too high to pass
beneath the bridges, and that Pennsylvania had incurred exceptional
expense developing improvements to facilitate the movement of
goods from the port of Pittsburgh.213 The Court found that the
bridges obstructed the navigation of the Ohio River to the irreparable
injury of Pennsylvania.214 To avoid imposing undue hardship on the
Bridge Company, the Court ordered that it "open a draw in the west-
ern channel which would admit the passage of boats, when, from the
high water they could not pass under the suspension bridge."215 The
Court also awarded costs to Pennsylvania.
Rather than comply with the Court's order, the Bridge Company
sought relief from Congress. On August 31, 1852, Congress passed
legislation declaring the bridges to be lawful structures and post-roads
for the passage of the mails, and mandating that ships be modified so
as not to interfere with the bridges.21 6 The matter appeared to have
been put to rest until the summer of 1854, when the bridge in Wheel-
ing was destroyed by high winds. Pennsylvania sought an injunction
to prevent reconstruction of the bridge. On June 28, 1854, Justice
Grier, sitting in equity, issued a writ of injunction requiring that the
bridge not be reconstructed in a manner inconsistent with the eleva-
tions which the 1852 Order found to be a nuisance. The Bridge Com-
pany, however, proceeded to build the bridge at an elevation lower
than provided for in the 1852 order. In December 1854, Pennsylvania
sought a contempt order and an award for execution of the costs de-
creed in the 1852 order. As a defense, the Bridge Company invoked
the statute declaring the bridge to be lawful.217
The Supreme Court held that the effect of the statute was to an-
nul the determination that the bridge was a nuisance. Justice Nelson,
writing for the Court, said that "although it still may be an obstruction
in fact, [it] is not so in the contemplation of the law."218 The Court,
however, sustained the prior judgment with respect to the execution
of costs. The Court reasoned that, although Congress can annul the
final judgment of a court concerning declarations of rights and equi-
212 See iU at 452 (Daniel, J., concurring) (questioning authority of the Court to sit in
original jurisdiction over the matter).
213 Id. at 437 (McLean, J., dissenting).
214 Id. at 439 (McLean, J., dissenting).
215 Id.
216 Id. at 429.
217 Id. at 424-28.
218 Id. at 430.
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table abatement of violation of those rights, it cannot annul finaljudg-
ments providing compensation for legal damages suffered by the
violation of those rights.21 9
While one might believe that the status of the proposed bridge
rested on the type of distinction between public and private rights that
the Court might draw today,220 such was not the understanding of the
Court in Wheeling Bridge. The precedents of the day drew the line be-
tween public and private rights by distinguishing between suits by a
citizen against the government and suits by a citizen against a citi-
zen.22 1 Thus, because the government was not a party in Wheeling
Bridge, the case involved only private rights. Moreover, the initial suit
was brought as an action in equity for nuisance, and therefore fell
within the traditional conception of private rights.222 Why, then, did
the Court permit the lifting of the injunction but not of the damages
award? One commentator hypothesizes that Wheeling Bridge recog-
nizes an exception to the indestructibility ofjudgments in cases involv-
ing governmental performance of regulatory functions. 223 Although
219 Justice Nelson wrote:
But it is urged, that the act of congress cannot have the effect and opera-
tion to annul the judgment of the court already rendered, or the rights
determined thereby in favor of the plaintiff. This, as a general proposition,
is certainly not to be denied, especially as it respects adjudication upon the
private rights of parties. When they have passed into judgment the right
becomes absolute, and it is the duty of the court to enforce it.
The case before us, however, is distinguishable from this class of cases,
so far as it respects that portion of the decree directing the abatement of
the bridge. Its interference with the free navigation of the river constituted
an obstruction of a public right secured by acts of congress ....
Now, we agree, if the remedy in this case had been an action at law, and a
judgment rendered in favor of the plaintifffor the damages, the right to these would
have passed beyond the reach of the power of congress. It would have depended, not
upon the public right of the free navigation of the river, but upon the judgment of the
court.
Id. at 431 (emphasis added). The Sixth Circuit emphasized this distinction between legal
and injunctive remedies when it found that § 27A(b) unconstitutionally interfered with
final judgments. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 1 F.3d 1487 (6th Cir. 1993), petition for
cert. filed, 62 U.S.L.W. 3503 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1994) (No. 93-1121).
220 See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prod. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 589 (1985) (equating
"public right" with some conception of public purpose).
221 See Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272,
283 (1855); Northern Pipeline Constr. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 68 (1982)
(The public-rights doctrine "extends only to matters arising 'between the Government and
persons subject to its authority in connection with the performance of the constitutional
functions of the executive or legislative departments.'") (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285
U.S. 22, 50 (1932)). See also Young, supra note 209, at 791-94.
222 See Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 68 n.25 (1982) ("What clearly remains subject to
Art. III are all private adjudication in federal courts within the States-matters from their
nature subject to 'a suit at common law or in equity or admiralty'-and all criminal mat-
ters, with the narrow exception of military crimes.").
223 Young, supra note 30, at 1239 n.237:
The fact that the legislation considered in the second Wheeling Bridge case
was enacted after the end of the appellate process in the first case makes
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we need not explore the complexities of takings law, we can recognize
that, as a necessary incident of governmental regulation, the rights of
private parties will be disturbed, but not eliminated, by regulatory ac-
tion. Thus, any prohibition of legislation with a retroactive effect
must be tempered by the realization that the government has a legiti-
mate interest in advancing regulatory ends.
C. Reconstructing Justice Chase's Opinion in Klein
This section explores how Justice Chase's rationale in Klein can
be read in a manner that renders it consistent with Wheeling Bridge and
Schooner Peggy. Two general theses are developed. First, neither the
dictation of fact exception nor the underlying law exception is sup-
ported by a reconciliation of, on the one hand, the dictum and hold-
ing of Klein and, on the other hand, the precedents on which it relies.
Second, a different exception to the Changed Law Rule emerges from
Klein. That exception focuses on the effect of purely retroactive legis-
lation on the respective powers of the legislature and judiciary.
As noted earlier, one test that has been attributed to Klein is the
dictation of fact exception: it is unconstitutional to dictate "how the
Court should decide an issue of fact.., under threat of loss ofjuris-
diction."224 The attribution of this rule to Klein rests on the direction
in the 1870 Proviso that pardons be treated as conclusive evidence of
disloyalty. In this manner, the legislature used a rule of evidence to
determine a finding of fact. The problem with attributing this hold-
ing to Klein, as Professor Young points out, is that there was no dis-
puted issue of fact in the case.225 The parties stipulated that Wilson
had in fact aided the enemy. The only issue in Klein was the legal
question of whether the pardon cured Wilson's act of disloyalty for
purposes of recovery under the 1863 Act. While it is true that the
1870 Proviso required a contrary finding of disloyalty in the case of
pardoned persons, such a rule of evidence (if otherwise constitu-
tional) was a change in the law of the 1863 Act (and therefore not a
dictation of fact at all). It may be that a change in a rule of evidence
may be a valid exception to the Changed Law Rule, but Klein did not
reach the issue.
An alternative test attributed to Klein, as discussed earlier, is the
underlying law exception: it is unconstitutional to prescribe a rule of
Wheeling Bridge a stronger case for a finding of unconstitutionality. Chase
may be saying that the principle recognized, but not applied, in Wheeling
Bridge also protects lower court judgments from revision unless revision is
justified. Revision was justified in Wheeling Bridge but not in Kein where the
revision was arbitrary and not necessary to the government's function as a
regulator.
224 See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
225 SeeYoung, supra note 30, at 1233-38.
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decision to the judiciary in pending cases without changing the under-
lying procedural or substantive law.226 The attribution of this rule to
Klein relies on the string of rhetorical questions posed by Justice
Chase.227 The addendum seems to gain support fiom Chase's at-
tempt to distinguish Wheeling Bridge. He noted that in Wheeling Bridge,
the statute did not prescribe an "arbitrary rule of decision;" rather, it
left the "court... to apply its ordinary rules to the new circumstances
created by the act."228 The new circumstance was the new "state of the
law" concerning the bridge.229 If this is what he meant, however,
Chase failed to tell us in what respect the 1870 Proviso did not change
the underlying law.
There are two reasons for believing that the underlying law ex-
ception does not capture Chase's intent. First, there is an alternative
way to interpret Chase's reference to Wheeling Bridge. The "underlying
circumstance" altered by the congressional action in Wheeling Bridge
was not a change in the law of nuisance per se, but rather a change in
the status of the bridge as wrought by Congress within its power to
establish post-roads.230 An incident of that power is the authority to
dictate the requirements of such roads.23' In contrast, the attempt to
revise the judgment on behalf of Klein was not a consequence of the
necessary performance of a regulatory function.232 Second, insofar as
the 1870 Proviso clearly changed law by modifying the law of evidence
regarding the required proof for claims under the 1863 Act, Chase
could not have endorsed the underlying law exception and reached
the result he did in Klein.
Chase's assertion about new law should be read instead to mean
that, because Congress' effort to change the law of pardons was un-
constitutional, the law remained unchanged. Congress could not con-
stitutionally override the executive pardon power. Thus, in contrast
226 See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
227 Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 146.
The court is required to ascertain the existence of certain facts and there-
upon to declare that its jurisdiction on appeal has ceased, by dismissing the
bill. What is this but to prescribe a rule for the decision of a cause in a
particular way? In the case before us, the Court of Claims has rendered
judgment for the claimant and an appeal has been taken to this court. We
are directed to dismiss the appeal, if we find that the judgment must be
affirmed, because of a pardon granted to the intestate of the claimants.
Can we do so without ailowing one party to the controversy to decide it in
its own favor? Can we do without allowing that the legislature may pre-
scribe rules of decision to the Judicial Department of the government in
cases pending before it?
Id.
228 Id. at 146-47.
229 Id. at 146.
230 U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 8.
231 See supra notes 211-23 and accompanying text.
232 See Young, supra note 30, at 1239-40 n.233 and 1241-43 n.245.
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to the new circumstances that existed in Wheeling Bridge, the fact that
the putative change in the pardon law was invalid meant that no new
circumstances were created by the 1870 Act. Because Klein found the
change in law created by the 1870 Proviso unconstitutional on this
ground, the Court was left with the "arbitrary rule" that the Court
dismiss for want of jurisdiction.
This analysis suggests that the "indirection" that Chase intends to
draw our attention to is Congress's attempt to both grant jurisdiction
to and withdraw it from the Court. The 1870 Proviso permitted the
Court to examine Klein's case and thus, pass on the constitutionality
of the attempt to alter the evidentiary effect of the pardon.233 Con-
gress first granted jurisdiction to achieve the result it sought from the
Court, and then, recognizing that the pardon prong of the 1870 Pro-
viso might be struck down, further provided for revocation of the ju-
risdictional grant upon a finding of unconstitutionality by the Court.
In other words, the jurisdictional revocation, viewed separately, was
intended solely to procure a result in the pending litigation. Thus,
Klein tells us that Congress may grant or withdraw jurisdiction, but to
permit Congress to do both at the same time would render the judici-
ary a mere puppet of the legislative branch.23 4
This approach appears to be supported by Chase's reference to
the "great and controlling purpose" of the statute, 23 5 by which he
meant the plain purpose evidenced by the statutory language. In this
regard, one should not confuse the issue of the legislature's motiva-
tion with the statutory purpose.23 6 In any case, the reference to "pur-
pose" suggests the possibility that Klein really foreshadows the
suggestion in Robertson: "that even a change in law, prospectively ap-
plied, is unconstitutional if the change swept no more broadly, or lit-
tie more broadly, than the range of applications at issue in the
pending cases."237 This rationale would thus create an exception to
the Changed Law Rule for legislation with a retroactive effect that is
limited to pending cases. 238
233 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
234 Young, supra note 30, at 1221-22.
235 Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 145.
236 If Chase meant to refer to legislative purpose, it is curious that he left out any
account of the discussions that occurred in Congress when the 1870 Proviso was being
considered. See Sager, supra note 49, at 77. Moreover, two years prior to Kein, Justice
Chase wrote in Ex parte McCardle "We are not at liberty to inquire into the motives of the
legislature." 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1869). But see Sager, supra note 49, at 74-77.
237 This quotation is from Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society, 112 S. Ct. 1407, 1415
(1992). Although the 1870 Proviso was purely retrospective insofar as it only altered the
legal status of past events, it did affect litigation commenced subsequent to the enactment
of the statute. SeeYoung, supra note 30, at 1222 n.179.
238 Such a reading must be reconciled with Wheeling Byidge. One can distinguish the
two cases on the ground that Wheeling Bridge involved the regulatory role of government,
whereas lein concerned a personal right of recovery against the government. Specifically,
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Along similar lines, Professor Young has argued that Klein creates
a somewhat narrower exception to the Changed Law Rule "for new
laws from which the government would benefit as a party to a lawsuit
in a proprietary context."23 9 His argument rests on the notion that
allowing Congress to change law in a manner favoring the govern-
ment undermines legislative accountability. 240 Were courts to apply
such new law, Congress could enjoy the appearance of having opened
itself to judicial scrutiny while, at the same time, reserving a less visible
means for shutting the door. Although Young does not frame his ex-
ception in terms of the purely retroactive nature of the -revocation of
the government's proprietary liability, his argument presumes that the
wrong in the changed law is the legislature's narrow purpose behind
altering pending litigation.
One final consideration may lend support to the claim that Chase
was creating an exception to the Changed Law Rule. Prior to Klein,
Wheeling Bridge dealt with the effect of the proposed bridge on the proprietary rights of
upriver users, and recognized that, as a general matter, congressional management of the
public roads and waterways will inevitably disturb such rights. In contrast, the position of
the government in Klein is arguably akin to that of a private party engaged in litigation
under the 1863 Act. SeeYoung, supra note 30, at 1224 n.183, 1229 n.206, and 1241 n.245.
239 Young, supra note 30, at 1244.
240 Young's argument is worth reprinting in full:
For those who agree with Henry Hart that, as a practical matter, a govern-
ment needs courts to legitimate certain of its activities, an explanation may
be as follows. To abolish courts or, even less drastically, to have no court
open to suits against the government, sends a clear signal to the electorate
that Congress has not chosen to exercise its constitutional option of subject-
ing certain of its actions to judicial scrutiny. Permitting Congress to create
such courts, but to ignore their judgments, involves a congressional choice
of unaccountability which is more complicated and, hence, less easily un-
derstood by the electorate. As a result, it is more difficult to correct at the
polls. When Congress acts as a regulator of public rights, it may need to
change the rules governing a pending case on a rationale similar to that
relied on by the Court in the WheelingBridge case. On the other hand when
the contest involves claims to money or property, such justification may not
be present. Particularly in cases like Klein, where, arguably, the government
has a sovereign immunity privilege that allows it to avoid a constitutional
attack, to permit the government to change the law because of some dissat-
isfaction with the result in pending cases would be to allow the government
to hedge its bets from the start. Congress can open its courts to claims
against the government hoping for a favorable resolution. If it wins, it wins
twice; once with the favorable verdict, and second by the fact that the gov-
ernment appears to have subjected itself to the rule of law. If the govern-
ment loses, it loses once; it can change the law on appeal. Indeed, it may
not even lose an appearance of accountability if its refusals to abide byjudg-
ments are few. Perhaps a prohibition against Congress' changing the law
on appeal, to favor the government, rests on a judgment that the judicial
branch ought not participate in Congress' giving the false impression that it
has opened the government to judicial scrutiny. If so, a prohibition against
changing the law on appeal to favor the government is one which increases
legislative accountability, by requiring that Congress either clearly open or




the Court had generally treated retroactive laws with disfavor and miti-
gated their effect by employing canons of construction, 241 by voiding
them as contrary to natural law,24 2 and, in the case of state legislation,
by characterizing the law as within the compass of the Contracts
Clause.243 The natural law theory rested, essentially, on the concep-
tion that retroactive legislation was judicial rather than legislative in
nature.244 Klein can be read as an effort by the Court to find a consti-
tutional hook for applying the natural law conception of retroactivity,
as inherently ajudicial issue, to that subclass of retroactive laws affect-
ing pending litigation.245 Chase's argument can be reconstructed as
241 Unless the language of the act explicitly provided for retroactive application, the
Court would construe the law to have only prospective effects. See Smead, supra note 160,
at 778.
242 See supra note 163.
243 See supra note 162.
244 For example, ChiefJustice Marshall wrote:
If the legislature be its own judge in its own case, it would seem equitable
that its decisions should be regulated by those rules which would have regu-
lated the decision of a judicial tribunal. The question was, in its nature, a
question of title, and the tribunal which decided it was either acting in the
character of a court ofjustice, and performing a duty usually assigned to a
court, or it was exerting a mere act of power in which it was controlled only
by its own will.
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 133 (1810). The currency of this notion of power
is reflected by Justice Story's comments:
Whether, indeed, independently of the constitution of the United States,
the nature of republican and free governments does not necessarily impose
some restraints on the legislative power, has been much discussed. It seems
to be the general opinion, fortified by a strong current ofjudicial opinion,
that since the American revolution no state government can be presumed
to possess the trancendental [sic] sovereignty, to take away vested rights of
property, to take the property of A and transfer it to B by a mere legislative
act. That government can scarcely be deemed to be free, where the rights
of property are left solely dependent upon a legislative body, without any
restraint. The fundamental maxims of a free government seem to require,
that the rights of personal liberty, and private property, should be held
sacred.
3 STORY, supra note 160, at § 1393.
These considerations have a modern analogue in Lon Fuller's discussion of retroactiv-
ity. Fuller argues that an underpinning of the morality of law is that it is not retroactive.
He derives this from a notion of"intendment" or reciprocity, whereby the populace cedes
to governance upon the understanding that, quoting Lilburne, "parliament will act toward
the citizen in accordance with its own laws so long as those laws remain unrepealed."
FULLER, supra note 178, at 51-62, 215-18.
245 This reading of K/ein must be tempered by the failure of the leading late-nine-
teenth century commentators to see the separation of powers as a limitation on Congress's
power to enact retroactive legislation. SeeWILLiAM P. WADE, A TREATISE ON THE OPERATION
AND CONSTRUGTION OF RETROACTIVE LAWS, AS AFFECTED By CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS 5-6 (1880); HENRY C. BLACK, AN ESSAY ON THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL PROHIBITIONS AGAiNST LEGISLATION IMPAIRING THE OBLIGATION OF CONTRA-TS, AND
AGAINST RETROACrrvE AND Ex PoST FACTO LAws (1887). Interestingly, Black recognizes the
breadth of the natural law position articulated in Caler v. Bul and byJustice Story. How-
ever, he appears to equate their understanding of legislative limitation and the social com-
pact with a robust version of due process. Id. at 224. One might conjecture that the scope
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follows: even if one recognizes that the legislative branch has the
power to enact retroactive legislation, that power cannot extend so far
as to encompass judicial action by the legislature in cases that are al-
ready before the courts unless there is some compelling reason to be-
lieve that the Constitution grants such a power. A compelling reason
arguably exists in the case of treaties (e.g. Schooner Peggy) and post-
roads (e.g. Wheeling Bridge).246
To summarize, our discussion of Klein has attempted to establish
three propositions. First, the contemporary reading of Kein as articu-
lating the dictation of fact or underlying law exceptions is incorrect.
Second, Klein supports the holding that Congress cannot make the
jurisdiction of the Court rest on its willingness to apply an unconstitu-
tional law. Third, Klein may also support a separation of powers limi-
tation on Congress' power to enact retroactive legislation for the sole
purpose of affecting pending litigation. We recognized in Part II that
this third proposition comports with the general principles of separa-
tion of powers doctrine. The following Part develops a separation of
powers test for applying these principles.
IV
AN ALTERNATIVE METHOD FOR DECIDING CASES INVOLVING
PURELY RETROACTIVE LEGISLATION
The suggestion recently cast aside by the Court in Robertson, that a
law is unconstitutional if it sweeps no more broadly than a range of
applications at issue in pending cases (call it the "Pending Case
Rule"), seems to encompass both the manipulation and retroactivity
concerns discussed in Part II. The Pending Case Rule implicates con-
cerns about the manipulation of courts because it recognizes that
such legislation targets judicial disposition of cases. The Pending
of Klein failed to emerge at this time because the concurrent development of substantive
due process rendered it unnecessary. See Kainen, supra note 172, at 123 (discussing the
emergence of due process and retroactivity).
246 Pugh v. McCormick, 81 U.S. (14 Wail.) 361 (1872), decided one year after K/ein,
presents some problems for this suggestion, but I do not think that they are dispositive.
The issue in Pugh was whether a note was admissible in evidence to prove a debt where the
plaintiff had failed to follow the procedures for obtaining post-stamps for the note. At the
time of trial, the law required the post-stamps to be obtained within a specific period of
time and plaintiff had failed to obtain them within that period. Notwithstanding this fact,
the trial court admitted the note into evidence. The Supreme Court held that the trial
court had erred in admitting the evidence, but nonetheless affirmed the trial court on the
ground that Congress had since retroactively changed the limitary period so that the note
was now admissible. Pugh is distinguishable from the suggested reading of Klein in three
respects. First, the legislative act in Pugh had retrospective and prospective effects, whereas
Klein involved legislation with only retrospective effects. Second, the legislation at issue in
Klein dearly targeted pending litigation, whereas the act in Pugh did not. Third, the result
in Pugh seems justified insofar as it reflects the probable expectation of the parties that the
note was valid at the time of contracting.
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Case Rule implicates retroactivity concerns because it acknowledges
that litigants in pending cases are being treated differently than they
had expected at the outset of the litigation. This Section of the Note
rejects the Pending Case Rule, arguing instead that a pragmatic bal-
ancing approach (call it the "Purely Retroactive Legislation Presump-
tion") to deciding cases involving purely retroactive legislation is
superior to the formalistic analysis offered by the Pending Case Rule.
It then applies the Purely Retroactive Legislation Presumption to sec-
tion 27A.
A. Devising a Test for Assessing the Constitutionality of Purely
Retroactive Laws under Separation of Powers Doctrine
If the arguments elaborated in the previous sections of this Note
are correct, the next question is what approach the Court should take
when examining purely retrospective laws. Two possibilities come to
mind: (1) the Pending Case Rule-a bright line rule providing that
purely retrospective laws are an exception to the Changed Law Rule;
and (2) the Purely Retroactive Legislation Presumption-a balancing
test resting upon consideration of a number of factors.
These two possibilities roughly demarcate the options suggested
in the academic debate regarding formalist and functionalist ap-
proaches to separation of powers doctrine.247 The formalists ply a cat-
247 The Supreme Court has employed both approaches at various times. See, e.g.,
Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (plurality
adopting formalist approach); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (formalist approach);
Morrison v. Olson 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (functionalist approach); Mistretta v. United States
488 U.S. 361 (1989) (functionalist approach). The battle lines between these approaches
were neatly drawn by the majority and dissent in Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v.
Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986). Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor observed:
In determining the extent to which a given congressional decision to au-
thorize the adjudication of Article III business in a non-Article III tribunal
impermissibly threatens the institutional integrity of the Judicial Branch,
the Court has declined to adopt formalistic and unbending rules.
Although such rules might lend a greater degree of coherence to this area
of the law, they might also unduly constrict Congress' ability to take needed
and innovative action pursuant to its Article I powers. Thus, in reviewing
Article III challenges, we have weighed a number of factors, none of which
has been deemed determinative, with an eye to the practical effect that the
congressional action will have on the constitutionally assigned role of the
federal judiciary.
Id. at 851 (citations omitted). In dissent, Justice Brennan responded:
The Court requires that the legislative interest in convenience and effi-
ciency be weighted against the competing interest in judicial indepen-
dence. In doing so, the Court pits an interest the benefits of which are
immediate, concrete, and easily understood against one, the benefits of
which are almost entirely prophylactic, and thus often seem remote and not
worth the cost in any single case. Thus, while this balancing creates the
illusion of objectivity and ineluctability, in fact the result is foreordained,
because the balance is weighted against judicial independence. The dan-
ger of the Court's balancing approach is, of course, that as individual cases
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egorical approach. They seek to define the powers allotted to each of
the three branches, taking notice of explicit exceptions provided in
the Constitution, and then assess whether the questionable branch act
falls within the definition of the acting branch's power. Formalists
may differ about the appropriate definition, but they are united by the
proposition that the boundaries of branch action must be strictly ad-
hered to if the separation of powers is to prevent undue accumula-
tions of power by a single branch.248
Regardless of the general merits of formalist methodology, the
Pending Case Rule appears to be unsatisfactory on two grounds. First,
the rule faces too much conflicting precedent. There is a long line of
Supreme Court precedents upholding purely retroactive laws on the
ground that such legislation simply was enacted to cure administrative
errors.249 Moreover, there are the Portal-to-Portal cases, which up-
held corrective legislation enacted for the purpose of safeguarding ex-
pectations which had been frustrated by a Supreme Court decision
interpreting a prior statute.2 50 Of course, there is also the conflicting
Wheeling Bridge decision. While these cases may present some
problems for a functionalist approach, the Pending Case Rule would
accumulate in which the Court finds that the short-term benefits of effi-
ciency outweigh the long-term benefits ofjudicial independence, the pro-
tections of Article III will be eviscerated.
Id. at 863-64 (citations omitted). For a sampling of the academic commentary analyzing
the two approaches, see Brown, supra note 1, at 1522-31; Stephen L. Carter, Constitutional
Improprieties: Reflections on Mistretta, Morrison, and Administrative Governmen 57 U. CHI. L.
REv. 357 (1990); Redish & Cisar, supra note 180, at 450; Strauss, supra note 1.
248 Compare Redish & Cisar, supra note 180, at 474 (adopting pragmatic definition of
branch power) with Lee S. Liberman, Morrison v. Olson: A Formalistic Perspective on Why the
Court Was Wrong, 38 AM. U. L. REv. 313, 343 (1989) (advocating an "originalist"
perspective).
249 See, e.g., Graham & Foster v. Goodcell, 282 U.S. 409, 429 (1931) ("it is apparent...
that a distinction is made between a bare attempt of the legislature retroactively to create
liabilities for transactions which, fully consummated in the past, are deemed to leave no
ground for legislative intervention, and the case of a curative statute aptly designed to
remedy mistakes and defects in the administration of government where the remedy can
be applied without injustice."); Forbes Pioneer Boat Line v. Board of Comm'rs of Ever-
glades Drainage District, 258 U.S. 338, 340 (1922); United States v. Heinszen & Co., 206
U.S. 370, 390-91 (1905). Notice that these decisions were rendered in the context of due
process challenges, not separation of powers challenges. Thus, the rationale, but not the
result, is distinguishable from the Pending Case Rule. Notice, also, that the cases develop-
ing the curative legislation exception'was decided in the era of Lochner, when substantive
due process provided a great deal of protection for property interests. The need for such
an exception under the current conception of substantive due process is absent.
250 Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1948). The case assessed
the constitutionality of the Portal to Portal Pay Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 251-262, which was
enacted in response to the Supreme Court's decision in Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery
Co., 328 U.S. 680 (1946). Anderson had the effect of greatly increasing employers' labor
costs, as well as giving employees undeserved "windfall payments." See 29 U.S.C. 251(a) (4)
(1988). See generally BATOR ET AL., supra note 55, at 376-77.
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require overruling them or creating numerous exceptions. 25' Assum-
ing the latter course, the supposed virtues of bright-line rules are nul-
lified by the development of numerous exceptions. 252 Moreover,
these precedents suggest that there may be situations in which pend-
ing case laws are justified and, perhaps, necessary accoutrements to
the proper functioning of government.253 There may simply be in-
stances when the adverse consequences of voiding a purely retroactive
statute outweigh the separation of powers problem.254 Thus, the
Pending Case Rule does not hold out much promise.255
251 One might argue that the creation of exceptions is antithetical to the formalist
enterprise. See, e.g.,Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Sioux Nation. 448 U.S. at 424, 427-34. He
contends that the changed law rule is not to be permitted as an exception. He then takes a
formal view of final judgments, asserting that Congress cannot alter law, even in a case
where such alteration is merely the waiver of a government defense.
252 See MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE NATuRE OF THE COMMON LAW 71-76 (1988).
253 One might wonder what the position of the amicus brief suggesting the Pending
Case Rule would be if the posture of the case had been the following: Suppose that the
Seattle Audubon Society had brought suit for injunctive relief against the BLM under an
environmental statute which, given the facts of the case, presented a close question as to
whether the agency was in compliance. Congress decides that it prefers Seattle Audubon's
position and thus, passes new environmental legislation that only governs the public lands
at issue in the case. The BLM pleads that the new law is an attempt by Congress to affect a
pending case.
254 Some formalists take the position that bright-line tests serve as a prophylactic to
greater violations. See Redish & Cisar, supra note 180, at 455-56. This view is akin to the
rule utilitarian's response to act utilitarianism (or functionalism). Even if, as a general
matter, rule utilitarianism is correct, it does not follow that it is appropriate in separation
of powers cases. This would only be true if the rule utilitarian could show that the greater
good is satisfied in the long run by adherence to the rule. The showing must assume that a
principled Court will fail to adopt the functionalist approach in the context of pure retro-
activity cases, which in turn would result in the undermining of thejudiciary. For example,
the invitation to test the stamina of the court in these matters would lead to excessive
litigation and inconsistent results. Both would undermine the judiciary's integrity and, in
some degree, undermine the credibility of Congress, which would constantly be engaging
in conflicts with the judicial branch. However, the issue of pure retroactivity is not likely to
be raised so frequently that it would generate these types of concerns. The primary goal is
to provide Congress with flexibility, while also providing a safety net for the populace. For
a definitive discussion of rule and act utilitarianism, see ALASDAIR MAC INrxRE, A SHORT
HISTORY OF ETmics 227-48 (1966).
255 These two not very subtle objections lead one to speculate about why the Court
expressed an interest in the Pending Case Rule at all. Does the Court see the Pending
Case Rule as an opportunity to create a kind of limited federal Lochnerism? Although the
scope of the federal courts' ability to frustrate congressional initiatives would be restricted
by limiting the court to pending case laws, that limitation is somewhat open ended. More-
over, adoption of the Pending Case Rule furthers the Court's disapproval of retroactive
legislation. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204 (1988). Moreover, since
the rule falls under the rubric of separation of powers, the legislative limitation comes only
at the expense of Congress and, therefore, does not sacrifice the Court's federalism con-
cerns. It may, in fact, promote federalism concerns where the federal change in law was
made to affect actions brought by private litigants against a state. Cf. M. David Gelfand &
Keith Werhan, Federalism and Separation of Powers on a "Conservative" Court: Currents and
Cross-Currents from Justices O'Connor and Scalia, 64 TuL. L. REV. 1443 (1990). Perhaps such
concerns are reading too much into Justice Thomas' oblique reference in Robertson to the
Pending Case Rule.
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In contrast, functionalist approaches, which this Note advocates
as the proper replacement for the current, formalist understanding of
Klein, focus on the question of whether the branch act will undermine
the ability of the hindered branch to perform its core function,256 or
whether the branch act will adversely affect the maintenance of the
values which underlie the separation of powers doctrine.2 57 This ap-
proach requires a balancing of the interests of the two conflicting
branches and a determination of whether the invasion by one branch
will lead to an improper diminution of the coequal role of the com-
peting branch.2 58
Since purely retrospective laws intrude on thejudiciary's capacity
to play its structural role in the maintenance of ordered liberty and
the prevention of the accumulation of governmental power, a func-
tionalist should take the view that such laws are prima facie suspect.
This status would trigger a balancing approach which recognizes the
different interests that arise when an act of the legislature has purely
retroactive effects, and especially strict scrutiny should be accorded to
legislation that affects only pending litigation.2 59
What should the balancing approach under the Purely Retroac-
tive Legislation Presumption look like? Somewhat tentatively, this
Note suggests that the Court consider the following factors: (1) the
legislative motive underlying the changed law; (2) the degree of reli-
ance on the old law; (3) the nature of the rights affected by the
256 Strauss, supra note 1, at 492-94.
257 See, e.g., Alfange, supra note 140, at 668; Leslie J. Harris, Rethinking the Relationship
Between Juvenile Courts and Treatment Agencies-An Administrative Law Approach, 28J. FAM. L.
217, 254 (1989) (distilling two essential elements of separation of powers analysis from
Nagel's tests: "[t]he first is to identify what function of which branch is being intruded
upon and to determine whether that function is central to that branch's constitutional role
... the second step is to determine whether the intrusion is too extensive."); Robert F.
Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REv. 661
(1978) (articulating four general tests for defining the limits imposed by the separation of
powers doctrine).
258 Plausibly, one can read Justice Chase's opinion in Klein as articulating-a functional-
ist approach. There, Congress set out to do two things: to change the law (albeit unconsti-
tutionally) and to limit the jurisdiction of the court. Both of these are within the general
prerogative of the legislative power-the first by virtue of its law-making capacity and the
second by virtue of Article III, Section 2-but they operated together under this statute to
undermine the judicial power. CompareJusticeJackson's comment: "[wihile the Constitu-
tion diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will inte-
grate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its branches
separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity." Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
259 A plausible argument can be made that the courts are actually engaged in this
balancing process under the rubric of the underlying law exception. The criteria for deter-
mining whether legislation is "law" is open-ended and susceptible to manipulation. See
supra notes 122 to 140 and accompanying text. Recasting the announced standard, as this
Note proposes, has the virtue of bringing to light the genuine rationales underlying the
determination of these cases.
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change in law; and (4) the real world consequences of refusing to
enforce the new law. These factors are a variant of the criteria consid-
ered by the Court when retroactivity issues arise in the context of gen-
eral legislation 26° and judicial law-making.261 The question before the
Court in Chevron Oil v. Huson was whether it should decline to apply a
new rule of law only to claims arising after the date of the decision.
Because the primary function of the judiciary is to decide cases and
controversies, the Court adopted these factors to serve as self-imposed
limitations on engaging in what essentially amounts to legislative law-
making. Purely retroactive legislation presents a reverse-Chevron Oil
scenario. Since the primary function of the legislature is to make laws
with prospective effect, the retrospective application of legislation
shades into the judicial function. The application of Chevron Oils
standards to determine whether Congress has overstepped its author-
ity creates a kind of equipoise between the branches.
The factors in the Purely Retroactive Legislation Presumption
conform to the goals of the separation of powers doctrine. First, by
examining the legislature's motive,262 the court may assess the degree
to which Congress is attempting to usurp the judicial function, as
feared by justice Chase in Klein.26 3 Second, the degree of reliance on
the old law measures the extent to which a party reasonably expected
an independent judiciary to enforce her rights under the old law.
Even though Congress is the culprit responsible for undermining reli-
260 In Bradley v. School Bd of the City of Richmond, the Court articulated a similar set of
factors for determining, in the case of Congressional silence, whether to apply legislation
retroactively. 416 U.S. 696, 717 (1974). See also Thorpe v. Housing Auth. of the City of
Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 282 (1969) (legislation to be accorded retroactive application, ex-
cept to prevent manifest injustice). More recently, the Court has shown hostility to the
retroactive application of legislation in the absence of an explicit legislative directive.
Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208-09 (1988) (when silent, the presump-
tion is that the legislation has only prospective effect).
261 Chevron Oil v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971) (the third prong of the Chevron test
provides that courts consider the inequitability of the result should the new rule be ap-
plied); see also Lampf 111 S. Ct. at 2786 ("Chevron Oil... [is] based on fundamental notions
ofjustified reliance and due process.") (O'ConnorJ., dissenting).
262 See John H. Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79
YATE L.J. 1205 (1970). For a discussion of the difficulties inherent in an inquiry into legis-
lative motive, see Paul Brest, The Misconceived Questfor the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L.
REv. 204, 205-17 (1980) (arguing that an original intent approach to constitutional inter-
pretation is untenable).
263 One can distinguish most of the Changed Law Rule line of cases on the ground
that they had prospective, as well as retrospective effects and, thus, were not primarily
aimed at altering the outcome of pending cases. See Pugh v. McCormick, 81 U.S. 361
(1871). This point also distinguishes cases finding partly retroactive laws to be acceptable
on due process grounds. Compare United States v. Sperry, Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 64 (1989)
(under due process clause Congress may not arbitrarily or irrationally make laws retroac-
tively applicable); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R. A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 728-31
(1984); Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co. 428 U.S. 1, 15-17 (1976).
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ance, the courts act as an accomplice. 264 When the frustration of a
person's reliance is egregious, the equitable function of the court as
the dispenser of justice is at risk. Third, factoring the nature of the
rights into the balance allows the court to identify legislation which
strikes at the core of ordered liberty. An example is ChiefJustice Mar-
shall's distinction between private rights and public rights in Schooner
Peggy. The fourth factor, appraising the real-world effects, implies
consideration of the practical institutional factors underlying the sepa-
ration of powers. For example, the court may distinguish between
suits against the government in its regulatory capacity and suits against
the government in its proprietary capacity-a distinction suggested by
comparing Wheeling Bridge, Klein and Robertson. When the government
acts in its regulatory capacity, this factor recognizes that thejudiciary's
ability to adjudicate matters at the heart of policymaking is limited;
whereas, in proprietary matters the posture of the government more
closely resembles that of a private citizen, and the controversy more
closely resembles ordinary private litigation. In the latter situation,
the judiciary does not face issues that it is unequipped to decide.
The Purely Retroactive Legislation Presumption admittedly
shades into the type of factors a court might examine in conducting a
due process analysis. Nonetheless, these factors are intended to be
more robust than the rather anemic inquiry required under the ra-
tional basis test.2 65 Although the legislature may have some legitimate
reason for acting purely retroactively, such a reason alone will not be
sufficient to overcome the presumption that the legislature has
usurped the judicial function. Rather, the reason must be of such a
magnitude that it outweighs concerns about the nature, degree and
duration of the reliance on the old law, as well as the extent to which
the legislature acted solely for the purpose of altering pending
litigation. 266
264 ConsiderJustice Marshall's comment: "it may be considered politically wise to get
a court to share the responsibility for arresting those who the Executive Branch has prob-
able cause to believe are violating the law. But convenience and political considerations of
the moment do not justify a basic departure from the principles of our system of govern-
ment." New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 742-43 (1971) (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
265 This is not to say that a rejuvenated conception of due process could not meet the
concerns raised by this Note, but rather that the present state of due process doctrine does
not. See Verkuil, supra note 1, at 307-11.
266 As this Note was going to press, a different approach was suggested by Professor
Amy D. Ronner in her excellent article, Judicial Self-Demise: The Test of When Congress Imper-
missibly Intrudes OnJudicial Power After Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society and the Federal
Appellate Court's ReJection of the Separation of Powers Challenges to the New Section of the Secuities
Exchange Act of 1934, 35 ARiz. L. REV. 1037 (1993). Professor Ronner's test finds that legis-
lation improperly invades the judicial function when:
[the legislation] is so precisely tailored to address the issues in the pending
matter that it can be said to fit glove-like around a live case or controversy
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B. Applying the Balancing Approach to Section 27A
We now consider the constitutionality of section 27A under the
Purely Retroactive Legislation Presumption. First, it is clear that sec-
tion 27A solely targets pending cases, and so triggers the balancing
test. How does section 27A come out in the balance?267
The motive underlying section 27A is the protection of the reli-
ance interests of plaintiffs in the pre-Lampflaw. The unique aspect of
section 27A is that, unlike the laws at issue in the other cases we have
discussed, it was put in place to restore the pre-existing law.268 While
some of the district courtjudges have expressed distress that the effect
of section 27A is to supplant a recent Supreme Court interpretation, it
and if at least one of the following factors is met. The first factor is that the
legislation has the effect of favoring the government as a party... The
second factor is that the intervening legislation infiltrates a domain that is
and can be viewed as a trarditionallyjudicial one.
Id. at 1071. While Professor Ronner's article correctly identifies the doctrinal void result-
ing from Robertson, her test has two principal difficulties. Her first factor is too broad, as it
would encompass cases where the government is a party in a proprietary role, as well as
cases where the government is a party in a regulatory capacity. The fact that her test would
require a different result in Robertson illustrates this concern. In addition, her second fac-
tor simply reintroduces the type of ambiguity that the Klein rules produced by requiring
identification of "judicial functions." Moreover, her example of such an instance-
namely, that § 27A violates this factor because it interferes with the operation of Beam-is
particularly unhelpful. If Beam is constitutionally grounded, then we do not need this ar-
gument to invalidate § 27A; on the other hand, if Beam is not constitutionally grounded,
then it is unclear why Congress may not legislatively alter court-made discretionary rules.
Such a view would seem to suggest that there is something improper about Congress legis-
lating in any area of the court's exercise of equitable discretion.
The central difference between Professor Ronner's analysis and the one offered in this
Note is that the Note emphasizes retroactivity. In keeping with a more formalist approach,
Professor Ronner's argument focuses on the nature of the judicial function and the intru-
sion caused by legislation that targets pending cases. This Note, on the other hand, fo-
cuses on the ends that the separation of powers doctrine seeks to reach and considers
whether purely retroactive legislation undermines those ends.
267 Note that the application of the balancing test to § 27A yields the perverse result of
requiring the court to do now what it failed to do in Lampf As Justice O'Connor noted in
dissent, the opinion of the Court failed to justify applying the new rule announced in
Lampfto the parties before them in Chevron 0i4 instead, the Court applied the new rule to
the parties without mentioning Chevron OiL The application of these factors amounts to a
repudiation of Lampf.




is instead its singular virtue.269 The legislation went no further than
reestablishing the status quo.270
Turning to the degree to which the defendants relied on the stat-
ute of limitations announced in Lampf the defendants evoke little
sympathy. With respect to the underlying substantive section 10(b)
claim, the defendants could not have relied on the new statutory pe-
riod because it did not exist. Moreover, while it is plausible that when
deciding to engage in illegal conduct a person calculates the chance
of detection within the limitation period, the defendants' calculation
at the time of their allegedly illegal conduct was the period imposed
by section 27A. Finally, the only window of opportunity for a change
in position due to reliance was between the date of the Lampfdecision
and the enactment of section 27A, which occurred six months later.
The public outcry against Lampf was strong, and it was reasonable to
infer from Congress' conduct that the Lampf limitation period would
not be long-lived. Reliance in such circumstances is not reasonable.
With respect to the nature of the rights affected, it is relevant that
the change wrought by section 27A only altered a limitation period in
a manner that matched the limitation period which the defendants
could reasonably have believed was applicable at the time of their ille-
gal conduct 2 7'
Since the government is not a litigant in these cases, the conse-
quences are limited to the effect that section 27A has on individual
parties, a fact which weighs in favor of striking down section 27A. As a
general matter, application of purely retroactive laws in matters involv-
ing private parties strikes at the core of the judiciary's dispute resolu-
tion role. Such laws constitute a manipulation of the political system
designed to corrupt the findings of an independent adjudicator. This
is one of the reasons that the result in Klein seems intuitively correct.
The government, as a private party, legislatively altered the legal rules
to procure victory in the presumably independent judicial forum.
Again, however, this factor is mitigated by the fact that the law merely
269 See Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254 (2d. Cir. 1948) (retroactive
statute effectuates expectation of parties at time labor contract was entered into); Pugh v.
McCormick, 81 U.S. 361 (1871) (prolongation of period to have note stamped satisfied
expectation of parties that the note was valid at the time of contracting). See also FuL.ER,
supra note 178, at 221 (retroactive change of law intended to alter a Supreme Court deci-
sion is morally justified where it reinstates expectations of parties that existed prior to an
unexpected and unforseen decision by the Court); Hochman, supra note 151, at 693 (ret-
roactive statute may effectuate intentions of the parties).
270 Congress was not blameless in the matter. The activity in the lower courts regard-
ing the limitation period should clearly have signalled that the federal courts wanted uni-
formity in this area and were awaiting Congressional action.
271 But see Stephen R. Munzer, A Theory of Retroactive Legislation. 61 TEx. L. REv. 425,
462168 (1982) (arguing that retroactive limitation laws "present an unusually egregious
example of retroactive impact").
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restores the ground rules that the parties expected would govern
when they entered the arena.
On balance, then, section 27A appears to be a reasonable effort
by Congress to enact legislation which preserves the status quo ante
Lampf
CONCLUSION
For the practitioner defending a section 27A case, the argument
set forth in this Note suggests three general conclusions. First, the
attempt to formulate a separation of powers challenge to section 27A
on the basis of the prevailing Klein rules, while meeting with limited
success in district courts, is not likely to succeed given the Supreme
Court's application of the rule in Robertson. Second, Klein offers some
support for the alternative proposition that retroactive laws the effect
of which falls no more broadly than on the class of pending litigants
are invalid. Thus, if the Court adopts the Pending Case Rule, section
27A is clearly invalid. Finally, although this Note concludes that the
Purely Retroactive Legislation Presumption is superior to such a for-
malistic rule, and that under this balancing approach section 27A is
valid, defendants should frame their separation of powers challenge
in the alternative by arguing that even under the Purely Retroactive
Legislation Presumption section 27A is invalid.
In a less practical vein, we should note that the irony of the sec-
tion 27A saga is that the opportunity it presents to insulate the judicial
power from legislative invasion is the result of the Court's movement
toward a more restrictive conception of the judicial power in Beam.
Notwithstanding this irony, the innovations represented in this Note
and Beam are complementary. Beam represents an attempt by separa-
tion of power formalists to limit equitable flexibility under the "cases
and controversies" of the Constitution. The problem with Beam, of
course, is that it invites future tit-for-tat exchanges between the Court
and Congress when the Court's refusal to restrict a new rule to pro-
spective application generates manifestly unjust results. Congres-
sional efforts to provide a corrective should be treated deferentially by
the Court. This raises the possibility, however, that a sterile incanta-
tion of Klein would serve to justify less benign efforts by Congress to
create legal rules whose application goes no further than pending
cases. An abandonment of the formalism embodied by the present
conception of Klein would allow the Court to defer to purely retroac-
tive changes enacted for the protection of parties whose reliance in-
terests were subverted by a new rule of the Court. At the same time, it
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would prevent the Court from yielding to Congress the power to alter
the outcome of pending litigation in other cases.
J. Richard Doidgef
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